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IMPROVING POLICE PERFORMANCE
THROUGH THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE-PART I:
CURRENT POLICE AND LOCAL
COURT PRACTICES
WAYNE R. LAFAVE*
What actual observation of police systems at work does suggest
is that the problem of police illegality is altogether more serious
and complex than is often supposed by proponents of the exclu-
sionary rule, and that easy assertions that the ride will make
significant contributions to the quality of police performance are
based on doubtful and uncertain assumptions.
Professor Francis A. Allen,
Federalism and the Fourth
Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf,
1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 39-40
Whatever may be said for the courts "preserving the judicial
process from contamination" or against the government playing
"an ignoble part" or about it being the "omnipresent teacher," I,
for one, would hate to have to justify throwing out homicide and
narcotic and labor racket cases if I did not believe that such action
significantly affected police attitudes and practices.
Professor Yale Kamisar
Public Safety v. Individual Liberties:
Some "Facts" and "Theories,"
53 J. Crim. L., C. & P. S. 171, 179 (1962)
A. INTRODUcION
From the time of Weeks v. United States' until the Supreme Court's
decision in Mapp v. Ohio2 nearly fifty years later, the advisability of
attempting to enforce the right of privacy through the exclusion of pro-
bative evidence in criminal cases has been a matter of continuing vigorous
debate.3 The argument against exclusion is summed up most succinctly
*Professor of Law, University of Illinois; B.S. 1957, LL.B. 1959, SJ.D. 1965,
University of Wisconsin.
1. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. Probably the last pre-Mapp debate was The Exclusionary Ride Regarding
Illegally Seized Evidence: An International Symposium, 52 J. CUM. L., C. & P.S.
245 (1961). A number of references are to be found therein to earlier written views
both pro and con.
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in Justice Cardozo's terse comment: "The criminal is to go free because
the constable has blundered."' The argument for exclusion has been put
on various grounds, but in recent years the main point of emphasis has
been that other means of protecting against unreasonable searches and
seizures are ineffective.5 Whatever the merits of these contentions, further
debate on whether the exclusionary rule should be adopted seems point-
less;0 Mapp has imposed the exclusionary doctrine on all states, and
there does not appear to be any basis for assuming that the Court will
in any way make inroads on the Mapp holding in the years ahead.
What, precisely, are the objectives to be realized through use of the
exclusionary rule? Courts and commentators have given various explanations
4. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
5. When Weeks was held inapplicable to the states, it was noted by the
Court: "The jurisdictions which have rejected the Weeks doctrine have not left
the right to privacy without other means of protection .... We cannot, therefore,
regard it as a departure from basic standards to remand such persons, together
with those who emerge scatheless from a search, to the remedies of private
action and such protection as the internal discipline of the police, under the eyes
of an alert public opinion, may afford." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1949).
Then, in one of the leading state cases adopting the exclusionary rule, the court
said: "If the unconstitutional [sic] guarantees against unreasonable searches and
seizures are to have significance they must be enforced, and if courts are to dis-
charge their duty to support the state and federal Constitutions they must be
willing to aid in their enforcement. If those guarantees were being effectively en-
forced 'by other means than excluding evidence obtained by their violation, a dif-
ferent problem would be presented. . . . Experience has demonstrated, however,
that neither administrative, criminal nor civil remedies are effective in suppressing
lawless searches and seizues." People v. Cahan, 44 Cal2d 434, 447, 282 P.2d 905,
913 (1955). The Supreme Court, in recently overturning Wolf, took note of this
language in Cahan, and then said: "The experience of California that such other
remedies have been worthless and futile is buttressed by the experience of other
States. The obvious futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment to the protection
of other remedies has, moreover, been recognized by this Court since Wolf. See
Irvinc v. California .... " Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652-53 (1961).
6. Criticism of the exclusionary rule, as such, has not completely abated,
however. See, e.g., Wilson, Comments at panel discussion on "How Do We Live with
Mallory, Mapp and Sun?," ABA, SECTION OF CRIMINAL LAw, 1963 PRoCEEDINGs 32(1964). Undoubtedly some of the criticism of the exclusionary rule, particularly
that which still continues, is misdirected in that the principle concern is with arrest
and search standards as presently defined. "The exclusionary evidence rule says
nothing about the content of the law governing the police. It takes no position
with respect to which arrests, searches and seizures, or other enforcement actions
are legal or illegal.... One can support the rule and still hold that the present
law of arrest ...is outmoded and requires drastic reformulation." Paulsen, The
Exclwrionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. Cui. L., C & P.S. 255(1961).
7. It has -been suggested, however, that because Mapp is based primarily upon
the notion that other remedies are lacking (see language of the Court, supra note 5),
Congress could do away with the exclusionary rule by providing other effective
sanctions. Taft, Protecting the Public from Mapp v. Ohio Without Amending the
Constitution, 50 A.B.J. 815 (1964).
[Vol. so
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from time to time. One objective, essentially ethical in nature, is to pro-
tect the integrity of the law enforcement system, and more particularly,
to "preserve the judicial process from contamination."$ Related to this
is the objective of insuring that the government does not profit from
its own wrongdoing.9 Similarly, it is sometimes said that the exclusionary
rule serves to provide some measure of vindication for the individual
whose constitutional right of privacy has been interfered with; there is
what has been characterized a "privilege against conviction by unlawfully
obtained evidence."10 But, however important and worthwhile these ob-
jectives, it is fair to conclude that the principal reason for the exclusion
of probative evidence is to favorably affect future police attitudes and
practices.
Although the Court in Mapp made a few bows toward other objectives,
the emphasis is on the exclusionary rule as a "deterrent safeguard." 1 "It
is clear that assumptions as to the efficacy of the rule in this respect
are of the first importance in the Court's view of the matter."' 2 As the
Court had said earlier in Elkins, "The rule is calculated to prevent, not
to repair."' 3 Justice Traynor puts it this way: "The objective of the ex-
clusionary rule is certainly not to compensate the defendant for the past
wrong done to him any more than it is to penalize the officer for the
past wrong he has done. The emphasis is forward."" It is this emphasis
forward, this objective of improving police performance, that gives the
exclusionary rule its most solid foundation. Opponents of the rule contend
that it protects the guilty and not the innocent, 5 but this is not so if
the consequence of exclusion is the deterrence of future illegal searches
and seizures of both innocent and guilty. Supreme Court cases in this area
are sometimes criticized on the ground that critical evidence is suppressed
simply because, after considerable reflection and thought, only four Jus-
8. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting). See also Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Federal Law of Searches
and Seizures, 33 IowA L. REv. 472, 498 (1948); Atz v. Andrews, 84 Fla. 43, 94
So. 329 (1922).
9. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961
Sup. Or. Rav. 1, 34; Cahan v. California, 44 Cal.2d 434, 449, 282 P.2d 905, 912
(1955).
10. Allen, supra note 9, at 35; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
11. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961).
12. Allen, supra note 9, at 37.
13. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
14. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE LJ. 319,
335.
15. Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 337, 371 (1939).
S1965]
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tices concur with the on-the-spot good faith decision of the police re-
garding a hitherto ambiguous question of search and seizure law.1' The
price of exclusion may be worth paying, however, if, as a consequence,
search and seizure standards are further developed and clarified, resulting
in a higher level of police performance in the future.
With improved police performance being the major objective of and
principal justification for exclusion, it is not at all surprising that thought-
ful commentators have said that "the ultimate test of the exclusionary
rules is whether they deter police officials from engaging in the objectionable
practices."'I Much of the pre-Mapp debate was addressed to the question
of whether the police are in fact deterred,'8 but this writing "is more
remarkable for its volume than its cogency."' 9 Notwithstanding the exist-
ence of the exclusionary rule on the federal level for nearly half a century
and in many states for almost as long, there has been no systematic
attempt to measure the precise impact of the rule or to determine the
limitations, if any, upon its effectiveness. The obvious difficulty is that
adequate empirical evidence to justify the conclusion either that the
police are deterred or that they are not deterred has been unavailable.
Moreover, it is not easy "to devise methods to produce a persuasive empir-
ical demonstration. '20
Although the present article is based in large measure upon observa-
tion of current police and local court practices,21- the objective is not to
16. Day, Criminal Law Enforcement and a Free Society, 54 J. CRim. L., C. &
P.S. 360, 361 (1963) ("In the past 23 years the Supreme Court of the United
States has handed down 21 opinions in which arrest, search, and seizure have been
the main issues. In only 1 case did the court agree unanimously."); Waite, Whose
Rides? The Problem of Improper Police Methods, 48 A.BAJ. 1057, 1057-58 (1962);
Kennedy, Prosecutors and Police-Their Common Bond, 49 J. Calm. L., C. & P.S.
367, 368 (1958).
17. Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 Nw.
U.L. REv. 16, 34 (1953). See also the statement of Professor Kamisar quoted in
the text at the outset.
18. For citations to many of these sources, see Allen, supra note 9, at 33
n.17 4 ; Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State
and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1083, 1146 n.227 (1959).
19. Allen, supra note 9, at 33.
20. Allen, supra note 9, at 34. He adds: "Perhaps all that can be asserted
with confidence is that the adoption of the rule in some jurisdictions has not elimi-
nated the factors resulting in many unreasonable searches and seizures. To date,
however, no effective quantitative measure of the rule's deterrent efficacy has been
devised or applied.... It is not remarkable, therefore, that the Court [in Mapp]
was confronted by the necessity of relying on hunch and inference in evaluating a
half-century's experience with the exclusionary rule. The dangers lie in assuming
knowledge that does not exist." Ibid.
21. Much of the empirical data upon which this article is based is derived
from the American Bar Foundation's field research in support of its Survey of the
[Vol. 30
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prove the case for those who claim the exclusionary rule does or does
not sufficiently deter to justify its existence. The rule's deterrent efficacy
-defies precise measurement, and, in any event, the issue is largely academic
since Mapp. What should be of concern, however, is whether the exclu-
sionary rule is doing as good a job of improving police performance as
one might hope, and if it is not, whether the factors which contribute
to this result can be identified. The present article is devoted to these
inquiries.
For the exclusionary rule to be completely effective in this regard,
it would seem necessary: (a) that the requirements of the law on arrest,
search and seizure, and in-custody investigation be developed in some
detail and in a manner sufficiently responsive to both the practical needs
of enforcement and the individual right of privacy;2 2 (b) that these require-
ments be fashioned in a manner understandable by the front-line lower-
echelon police officer23 and that they be effectively communicated to him;
Administration of Criminal Justice in the United States, with which the author
has been associated for approximately the last six years. For an analysis of some
of this data, see LAFAVE, ARST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY
(1965). Other volumes in this series, soon to be published, are on the detection of
crime, the charging decision, the adjudication decision, and the sentencing decision.
The ABF field studies were conducted in Kansas, Michigan, and Wisconsin,
and focus primarily upon practices in Wichita, Detroit, and Milwaukee. The
present article is also based upon observations by the author of current practices
in Illinois, primarily in the city of Chicago.
No attempt is made herein to identify certain practices with specific localities.
In part, this is necessary to preserve confidential sources of information. Moreover,
identification is not necessary, as the purpose of this article is not to criticize
any agency with respect to the most difficult problems it faces, but rather to re-
port and analyze such practices as do exist in the hope that it will provide a solid
basis for improvement. It should not be assumed that all of the practices described
necessarily prevail in all of the jurisdictions named above.
22. It is true, of course, that "the exclusionary evidence rule says nothing
about the content of the law governing the police" (see Paulsen, supra note 6),
and that therefore it is possible to discuss the exclusionary rule without any
mention of the legal standards for arrest, search and seizure. Yet, much of the
case for the exclusionary rule as a means of improving police performance rests
upon the notion that the exclusionary sanction forces development of search law
by the courts and induces legislative attention to the subject. See Paulsen, supra
note 6, at 260; Kamisar, Some Reflections on Criticizing the Courts and "Policing
the Police," 53 J. CaIM. L., C. & P.S. 453, 457 (1962). Thus, attention to the way
in which courts and legislatures have responded to this need to define search
standards is properly a part of any consideration of the extent to which the ex-
clusionary rule has improved police performance.
23. "Every moment of every day, somewhere in the United States, a law
enforcement officer is faced with the problem of search and seizure. He is anxious
to obey the rules that circumscribe his conduct in this field. It is the duty of this
Court to lay down those rules with such clarity and understanding that he may
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and (c) that the police desire to obtain convictions be sufficiently great
to induce them to comply with these requirements. Currently, it is fair to
say, deficiencies in all three respects exist.
In the following pages, current practices by the police and local
courts bearing upon these deficiencies are explored. In Part II of this
article, to appear in the next issue of this Review, attention is given to
the present state of police training and to the contributions of the legis-
latures and appellate courts in the way of sound and understandable
norms on arrest, search and seizure, and in-custody investigation.
B. THE POLICE AND THE LOCAL COURTs
Although trial judges "have little or no direct authority to require
police and other law enforcement agencies to comply with the rules
of the game," 24 day after day local courts must rule on the admissibility
of evidence alleged to have been obtained by improper police conduct.
Ideally, it would seem, individual rulings of this kind would further the
objectives of the exclusionary rule by, first, reminding the errant of-
ficer once again that evidence obtained in violation of "the rules of the
game" cannot be admitted, and second, informing the officer in cases of
exclusion that the particular tactics employed are not within these rules.
In the great many cases in which the prior improper police action oc-
curred, not as a result of deliberate wrongdoing, but merely "from an
excess of zeal on the part of the conscientious officer concerned to perform
the arduous task of law enforcement as best he can,"12 5 the norm-defining
function is undoubtedly of primary importance. The threat of evidence
exclusion can have little impact unless decision-making officers have some
basis for determining what conduct will bring about exclusion.
The significance of this supervision of police conduct by local courts
cannot be overstated; to the average police officer "the law" concern-
ing arrest, search, and other police practices is in large measure repre-
sented by his direct and indirect knowledge of the attitudes of the local
judiciary. This is particularly so in those departments where training on
relevant statutes and appellate cases is less than adequate.26 Most police-
men, if asked to define the limitations on their authority, would respond
24. Brennan, Judicial SupervLsion of Criminal Law Administration, 9 CRME
AND DELINQUENCY 227, 228 (1963).
25. Ibid.
26. The matter of deficiencies in police training will be explored in Part II.
[Vol. ,30
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on the basis of: (a) their understanding of judicial rulings in cases in
which they have appeared; and (b) their understanding of the rulings,
often passed on only by word-of-mouth, in cases involving their fellow
officers.27 The position of primacy given these decisions by the police accords
with the realities of the situation, as these local court rulings on police
practices, even if erroneous, are seldom made the basis for an appeal to a
higher court.2 8
Opponents of judicial supervision of police conduct have sometimes
declared that instead of policing the police the courts should devote their
energies to "getting their own house in order."29 But, while the quality
27. I was somewhat taken aback when an Illinois police officer with con-
siderable experience recently remarked that the efforts of his unit in enforcing the
laws against gambling were continuously frustrated because of the "archaic state
of the law." Illinois has a new substantive code of criminal law with a clear and
complete definition of gambling, enacted' in 1961, and also has a comprehensive
and very much up-to-date code of criminal procedure, enacted in 1963, with
broad powers of arrest, search and seizure. Moreover, it is fair to say that the
decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court have generally defined the powers of the
police broadly with regard to arrest, search, and pre-arrest and post-arrest in-
vestigation. When I asked the officer to give some specific illustrations, he made
no mention of the statutes and appellate cases but instead recited the circumstances
of a number of local court rulings which, if he reported them accurately, were
considerably more restrictive.
28. "Quite generally, a ruling on the motion to suppress is not itself appeal-
able because it is not regarded as a 'final order' or for some other reason. On
the other hand, if the motion is granted and the evidence suppressed, the prosecu-
tion may have no case, with the result that the charge must be dismissed or the
defendant acquitted. If the defendant is acquitted, the prosecution, of course, is
barred from access to the appellate court by appeal. The serious consequence of
this situation is that, particularly in areas of criminal litigation such as gambling,
where motions to suppress are frequently filed and frequently granted, the decisions
of trial judges are substantially immune from effective appellate supervision.
There is reason to believe that the search and seizure law being applied in inferior
trial courts sometimes bears only coincidental relation to the principles announced
in decisions of the highest court of the jurisdiction?' Allen, The Exclusionary Rule
in the American Law of Search and Seizure, 52 J. Cram. L., C. & P.S. 246, 249
(1961).
In states where an appeal can be taken, the limited resources of the prosecutor's
office makes possible only a few appeals from these rulings. Moreover, the selec-
tion of cases for appeal by the prosecutor's office is not always done wisely.
Of course, erroneous rulings in the other direction-that is, upholding what
are in fact illegal searches-may not be appealed either. The defendant's repre-
sentation may be less than adequate, he may not be able to afford an appeal, or
the low sentence may make appeal impractical.
29. "The courts have no right to police the police. That is an executive and
not a judicial function. Furthermore, the courts have enough troubles of their own.
Witness what goes on in some of the municipal or magistrate courts of our large
cities. In my opinion there are, in such courts, more hurts to the innocent and
more trampling over of basic individual civil liberties and ethical considerations
than you will find in most police departments. Much of the concern, energy, and
efforts that the courts expend with respect to police conduct could be better
1965]
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of justice in the lower criminal courts, particularly in large metropolitan
centers, has long been a subject of criticism,3 few would seriously con-
sider the proposition that judicial review of police practices should await
further improvements in the operation of local courts. More appropriate,
perhaps, is an inquiry into how good a job the local courts are doing in
policing the police, considering the nature of the operation of these courts
in current criminal justice administration. As to this "delicate problem
in the relationship of judge and officer,"3' 1 it can be asked: To what extent
is the front-line judiciary effectively contributing to the control of police
practices by the declaration of sound, understandable,3 2 and consistent-3
rules in a manner which can be expected to favorably influence subsequent
police actions?
1. Court Evaluation of Police Conduct
A common complaint of the police is that local courts fail to recognize
and understand their problems, so that rulings on prior police conduct are
made without an adequate factual picture of the law enforcement context
out of which the particular issue arose. "Peace officers . . . ask that the
courts look at the facts that lead to an arrest, or a search and seizure,
at the time, the place, and under the circumstances, as seen by an arrest-
ing officer in the light of his specialized training and- experience."3 4 Con-
sidering the manner in which and the circumstances under which issues
regarding police practices are put to trial judges, it is not surprising that
the police complaint has some validity.
Evaluation of police conduct is a significant part of the business
of the crowded misdemeanor courts of the large cities, as these courts
handle gambling and other cases in which the manner of acquisition of
physical evidence by the police is likely to be the only real issue before
the court. It is not uncommon for these courts to spend a substantial
spent on getting their own house in order." Inbau, The Social and Ethical Re-
quirements of Criminal Prosecution, 52 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 209, 212 (1961).
30. See Nutter, The Quality of Justice in Misdemeanor Arraignment Courts,
53 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 215 (1962); Note, Metropolitan Criminal Courts of First
Instance, 70 HARv. L. REv. 320 (1956); Dash, Cracks in the Foundation of Crimi-
nal justice, 46 ILL. L. Rzv. 385 (1951).
31. Brennan, supra note 24, at 228.
32. See Justice Clark's caution to -his brethren on the Court quoted in note
23 supra, which would seem equally applicable to local courts.
33. Justice Clark went on to observe in Chapman, supra note 23, at 623
that inconsistent rules are "disastrous to law enforcement."
34. Day, Criminal Law Enforcement and a Free Society, 54 J. C-"tm. L., C. &
P.S. 360, 364 (1963).
[Vol. 30
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portion of their time, perhaps the first few hours of each day's session,
in hearing motions to suppress evidence. Cases in which motions have been
made are often dealt with quickly, one after another, and disposed of
before other cases, involving only a trial on the merits, are heard.
In many of these courts, defense counsel in a given case will orally
present his motion to suppress without assigning in advance any specific
reasons for it. Rather, the arresting-searching officer is immediately sworn
and cross-examined by the defendant's attorney.35 Although this attorney
may not be familiar with the facts which led up to the search of his
client, he nonetheless will ask a series of questions (the same questions
are put in about every case) designed to establish that the critical ev-
idence was uncovered in a search and that the search was not preceded
by certain and direct knowledge by the officer of defendant's violation
(which is ordinarily the same thing as establishing that the items were
uncovered by search, since the violation in question is usually possession
of the items sought to be suppressed). During this examination the assistant
state's attorney or district attorney assigned to this courtroom, who
has had no opportunity for advance preparation to oppose the motion,
is likely to be frantically examining the officer's written report of the
case for the purpose of getting clear in his own mind the circumstances
leading up to the arrest and search. However, this report, prepared pri-
marily for other purposes, is not likely to be very revealing in this regard
even if carefully written, which is the exception rather than the rule.
Even when the officer is examined by the prosecution, it is unlikely
that he will have an opportunity to relate all of the facts and circum-
stances that prompted him to make the arrest and search. Rather, the
assistant state's attorney will put a few questions to the officer in an
often unsuccessful attempt to uncover some facts which would afford a
basis in law for the arrest and search. In the few instances in which the
officer is given an opportunity to fully develop all of the relevant facts, he
often is unable to do so effectively and completely.
By way of illustration, the arrest of a "bagman" (a courier for a
policy or numbers operation) which resulted in the finding of a package
of bet slips on his person might in point of fact be based upon this in-
35. It is apparently this procedure that prompts the police complaint that
"in many cases we find that our officers appear to be on trial, rather than the
person charged with crime." Quote of a chief of police in ABA SECTION OF CRIMINAL
LAW, 1955 COMMITTEE REPORTS 44 (1956).
19651
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formation: that he has a previous record as a-bagman; that he has been
observed for some days traveling a regular route in an area of the city
where policy is a popular pastime; that he is making stops at a number
of locations, some of which have been identified in the past as "policy
stations"; that he made these stops during a time of day when policy
slips are usually picked up; and, perhaps, that he is carrying a package
with something in it."" Defense counsel's examination of the officer will
establish that the officer did not actually see the gambling paraphernalia
until after the arrest, and the prosecution's attempt at rehabilitation may
only produce the vague assertion by the officer that the defendant was
a "known policy employee" (which may be the only information recorded
on the arrest report).1
Even if the facts are fully developed, the judge is seldom afforded
any additional guidance for his decision. Both defense and prosecution,
equally unprepared because of the circumstances, do little by way of
citing authority to support their respective positions. The trial judge is
unlikely to make any direct inquiry into the beneficial or detrimental
aspects of the law enforcement practice in question, and even if a ques-
tion is asked, trial counsel seldom are able to present accurately a picture
of the current practice and why it is followed. No such inquiry is made of
the police officer, and if asked he would undoubtedly disclaim responsibility
for making this kind of evaluation. Under these circumstances, there is
no assurance that the trial court's decision will be sound, or where there
36. In states where possession of such slips is a misdemeanor, but a misde-
meanor arrest can be made without warrant on reasonable grounds to believe,
as is the case in Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 28-1, 107-2 (1959), or in states
where the suspect's conduct is a felony, for which arrest without warrant on
reasonable grounds is possible, as is the case in Michigan, MicH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 28.773 (making indictable common law offenses felonies, which has been held
to include conspiracy, People v. Smith, 296 Mich. 176, 295 N.W. 605 (1941); a
runner for the policy syndicate clearly appears to be engaged in a conspiracy),
28.874, such evidence would seem to be sufficient for arrest and search. In
states where the conduct qualifies only as a misdemeanor, and the more com-
mon in-presence arrest requirement prevails, the critical question is whether
the in-presence norm requires actual direct observation of the offense itself
or only observation of facts and circumstances giving reasonable grounds to
believe that the offense is occurring in the presence. See LAFAVE, ARIEST: THE
DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY ch. 11 (1965).
37. An empirical study of the operation of Chicago Municipal Court some
years ago also underscored the general failure to adequately develop the facts
upon a motion to suppress. "The routine has become so common that there is
now very little attention paid to the facts and the motions are made and sustained
as a matter of course .... In most instances the farce played out in this branch
[Vol. 3,0
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is a relevant principle previously announced by a higher court of the
state, that the decision will be consistent with it.S
If one moves to the less hectic felony court or to the more leisurely
rural courtroom, the circumstances are more conducive to intelligent
assessment of the police practices being challenged. Yet, it is fair to say
that there as well, many factors are present which militate against an
adequate evaluation. Although the mind of the arresting-searching officer
may be probed in greater detail, limitations in the officer's narrative ability
may still be a serious drawback. And even if the facts of the individual
occurrence are adequately developed, the prosecutor still can seldom
articulate the relevant problems as they appear to the police, as he is
relatively detached from the day-to-day problems of the police and from
the enforcement practice which gives rise to the legal issue in the partic-
ular case. While private counsel representing a business client would be-
lieve it to be of utmost importance to consult fully with his client, prosecu-
tors commonly proceed on the assumption that the police need not be
consulted.
Thus it is that local judges are time and time again called upon to
evaluate questioned police conduct without an adequate development of
the facts, without a sufficient presentation of existing authority, and with-
out the necessary understanding of the law enforcement context within
which the practice in question occurs.39
of the Municipal Court obscures the factual situation." Dash, supra note 30, at 391.
38. See the comment on the inconsistency between trial court and appellate
court action, supra note 28.
Thus, the police sometimes indicate their complaint is not addressed to the
higher courts but only to the local courts: "The police can also live with the
exclusionary rule as applied by the higher courts of our states. The shoe begins
to pinch in the lower courts, however, where frequently evidence is suppressed and
defendants set free on grounds that I feel would not be sustained in our higher
courts." Wilson, Police Authority in a Free Society, 54 J. Gim. L., C. &. P.S. 175,
177 (1963).
39. All of the preceding comments have to do with evaluation of police
conduct by trial judges with training and experience in the law. When this task
is performed by nonlawyer magistrates, as is sometimes the case in Philadelphia,
the situation can hardly be expected to be any better.
"The search and seizure question is frequently raised before the magistrate
at the preliminary hearing which is ordinarily held the morning after the arrest
in one of twelve divisional police courts throughout the City of Philadelphia.
The cry of Mapp v. Ohio is raised before the magistrate whenever there is physical
evidence, a police officer who seized it, and, most important, a defense counsel
to object to it. Defendants are not represented by counsel in most preliminary
hearings, however, so that the magistrates are rarely confronted with this issue.
When they are, the Assistant District Attorney, who attends all such hearings,
is instructed to request that the question not be ruled upon by the magistrate,
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2. Police Understanding of Local Gourt Action
Implementation of the exclusionary rule at the local level has a
limited impact upon subsequent police action because a clear picture of
local court attitudes is not communicated back to the police department.
The individual officer whose case has been lost is not expected to report
back to his superiors precisely why this occurred. Some rulings, ordinarily
those the testifying officer believes to be particularly outrageous, may be
passed on to other officers, but often become distorted in the retelling.
A "court officer" or other representative of the police department may be
on regular duty in the courtroom, but his responsibilities are not thought
to include evaluation of and reporting on the loss of cases because of
rulings on police conduct. Although police generally manifest a real con-
cern with what happens to their cases once they reach court,40 they
have failed to make a concerted effort to gain an adequate understanding of
precisely what practices need be avoided to prevent exclusion of evidence
in the local courts.
The situation is complicated, however, by the fact that the opportunity
for even the testifying officer to comprehend adequately the court's rul-
ing and its basis is limited. As indicated earlier, defense counsel will very
often present his motion to suppress unsupported by any specific allegation
of wrongdoing by the police. As the hearing on the motion progresses, it
who need not -be a lawyer, but he reserved for the Court of Quarter Sessions on a
motion to suppress pursuant to Rules 100 and 101. The District Attorney's Office
has insisted on this position in view of the complicated factual situations and
subtle legal problems which defy solution even after extensive hearings, analysis,
briefing, and legal argument before judges learned in the law. Nevertheless,
magistrates do on occasion suppress evidence at the preliminary hearing.
"In those cases in which the magistrate has decided adversely to the Com-
monwealth, the District Attorney's Office has a remedy by asking for a rearrest.
In that event, the defendant is brought before a judge in the Court of Quarter
Sessions for a second preliminary hearing. At that time the judge can rule on the
search and seizure question in virtually the same way as he would were he con-
sidering a pretrial motion to suppress. As a discretionary matter, however, the
District Attorney does not seek rearrests in all cases where the magistrate has
discharged the defendant; therefore the dispositive order on the constitutional
question of search and seizure is sometimes made by the magistrate." Spector,
Mapp v. Ohio: Pandora's Problems for the Prosecutor, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 4, 29-30
(1962).
40. Although some have asserted that the police "are generally insensitive
to a court's rejection of evidence merely because of the impropriety of the meth-
ods used to obtain it," Inbau, Restrictions in the Law of Interrogation and Con-fessions, 52 Nw. U. L. Ray. 77, 78 (1957), I have not found this to be the case,
particularly when the entire case rests upon the evidence in question. The ex-
ception, however, is when there has developed an arrest-for-purposes-other-than-
conviction policy such as discussed infra at p. 421.
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is not uncommon for there never to be a clear statement by any party
or by the judge himself of precisely what aspect of the officer's actions
lies at the heart of the controversy. When the judge ultimately either
grants or denies the defense motion to suppress, it is unlikely that he will
give any explanation. Any elaboration on the ruling is directed toward
counsel, and no effort is made to enlighten the officer on the matter. 1
The arresting-searching officer, upon hearing the judge declare "motion
granted," usually departs with a bewildered expression on his face; sel-
dom does he have any clearer understanding of the limitations on his
authority than he had prior to the hearing.4 The assumption apparently
is that police practice is positively influenced by exclusion of evidence
even without police knowledge of why the decision was made.
3. Inconsistency in Mudtijudge Courts
There has been considerable attention to the fact that disparity in
sentencing is undesirable because, among other things, it has an adverse
effect upon offenders. 43 The problem of disparity in sentencing practices
41. Although a hearing on a motion to suppress does not present the most
desirable circumstances for effective education of police officers concerning their
authority and its limitations, it is unclear why so many trial judges fail to
make even a minimal effort toward achieving the "police-educating" objectives
of the exclusionary rule. The pressures of time in the metropolitan courts may
be the principle explanation. However, a harassment-type police enforcement
program, discussed infra p. 427, if it includes bringing those being proceeded
against into court for judicial termination of the case, may also contribute.
Local judges may be aware of-and may approve of-such a program, in which
case explanation to the officer of the reasons for dismissal is hardly necessary.
See Comment, 47 Nw. U. L. REv. 493, 498-99 (1952). However, if the judge is
uncertain as to which cases brought before him are a consequence of this program
and which are instances of a conscientious attempt to obtain a conviction, he
may refrain from any attempted explanation in all cases.
42. This is so notwithstanding the fact that the exclusionary rule has long
been in effect in these jurisdictions. As might be expected, officers first faced
with exclusion after Mapp, with little or no prior background on the requirement
for a lawful arrest or search, also learned little from the process of evidence ex-
clusion in local courts:
"In the first days after Mapp, law enforcement officials in Philadelphia were
uncertain as to what course to take. Policemen, who for years had presented their
evidence in court without any regard to how it had been obtained, could not
understand the subtleties of what constituted a legal search and seizure. When
some Philadelphia trial judges applied principles from liberal federal decisions on
search and seizure, the vice squad detective and the policeman on the beat could
understand neither the logic of what had been decided nor the formula for how
to act in the future in order to obtain admissible evidence." Spector, supra note 39,
at 5. He concludes that "the right to privacy has not been significantly promoted
during that time [the first year after Mapp] since the police have not fully
understood and hence not fully complied with the Mapp rule." Id. at 42.
43. See, e.g., Glueck, The Sentencing Problem, 20 Fed. Prob. 15 (Dec. 1956).
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of judges within a particular metropolitan court is especially acute, as
it encourages "judicial shopping" and "has redounded in favor of the
professional criminal or 'repeater' as opposed to the first offender.""
Disparity in decisions on what police behavior is proper has an equally
detrimental effect. It likewise tends to favor the professional criminal,
and perhaps more important, impairs to a considerable extent the desired
consequence of exclusion: a higher standard of police performance in
future cases. This disparity in judicial standards for police conduct appears
to be fairly common in multijudge courts, and has been the object of
criticism.45
Inconsistent rulings by the various judges of a multijudge court
compound the previously described difficulty of effectively communicating
to the police the standards for future performance. If one judge approves
what another judge disapproves, then the officer who has presented
similar cases before both judges lacks a clear understanding of whether
or not his conduct was really proper. Moreover, once an officer discerns a
substantial disparity between the attitudes of the various judges, he
may conclude that if the judges cannot agree then it is futile for him to
try to determine and abide by any set standards.
One of the major impediments to the effective operation of the ex-
clusionary rule as a means of elevating police performance has been the
lack of understanding by the police that courts have an obligation to
insure that law enforcement methods conform to the standards essential
for the maintenance of a -democratic society. Too often the police view
the courts as a roadblock in the way of enforcement rather than as an
agency sharing responsibility for the development and maintenance of a
fair and effective enforcement system. Police acceptance of the true role
of the courts is not enhanced, however, when they come to recognize
that the various judges of the court are not applying the same standards
to them; the observed disparity in standards bolsters the oft-held suspicion
that the courts are not acting for the high purpose of protecting the rights
of criminal defendants, but are merely interested in freeing some of the
guilty.
44. Nutter, supra note 30, at 217.
45. E.g., "Unfortunately, what may be 'reasonable' to one judge may not
be 'reasonable' to another .... One judge deciding a motion to suppress may find
the search reasonable. At the trial, another judge may find it not reasonable."
Comments of Kings County, N. Y., District Attorney Edward S. Silver, in ABA
SECTION OF CRIMINAL LAW, 1962 PROCEEDINGs 26-27 (1963).
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The animosity between police and court is increased, resulting in
still less acceptance of the court role of police supervision, when the in-
consistency in the attitudes of local judges leads to "judicial shopping."
Police respect for the processes of the court falls sharply when it becomes
apparent that the exclusion of evidence in a given case depends in large
measure upon the ability of defense counsel to maneuver the case before
a judge who holds the particular law enforcement practice in contempt.4 0
Illustrative of the technique is this description of the Chicago practice:
Sometimes the judge denies the motion to "suppress" the
evidence. Defense counsel will then demand a jury trial. This
automatically results in a continuance and reassignment of the
case to another judge. When he hears the case, the defense
attorney renews the motion to "suppress" the evidence hoping
that this judge will accede. The jury trial is not really wanted,
of course. It is immediately waived when defense counsel has
achieved his real objective, which is simply another hearing from
another judge on his motion to quash the search warrant or sup-
press the evidence. The defense attorney has every expectation
that eventually a judge will rule in his favor. So he applies for
continuances, or for a change in venue, or for a jury trial until he
gets the case before the right judge. Such maneuvers are usual,
not exceptional.4 7
Disparity in attitudes of local judges regarding proper police conduct
also results in police frustration. Perhaps no one judge's standards are
unduly restrictive; each judge will suppress where certain police practices
have been established, but he will also admit evidence which certain of his
colleagues would suppress. When the police cannot know in advance which
judge will hear a particular case 8 (and it is unlikely that they can know
46. Commenting on the then proposed code of criminal procedure for Illi-
nois, Chicago Superintendent of Police 0. W. Wilson took note of proposed sec-
tion 50-11(e), which said that "the motion [to suppress] shall be made only be-
fore a court with jurisdiction to try the offense but the motion may be renewed
if the trial takes place before a judge other than the one who heard the motion,"
and then remarked:
"While we recognize the need for these provisions, we are concerned over
a current practice whereby counsel is able to have a case transferred from one
judge to another, renewing the motion to suppress before each judge. It is ques-
tionable as to how this problem can be solved, but current practice is clearly
neither necessary nor desirable." Wilson, Comments Presented at the Con-
ference on the Proposed Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure, University of Illi-
nois College of Law, Jan. 12, 1963, pp. 16-17 (mimeo.).
No change was made in the Code in response to this criticism. ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 38, § 114-11(e) (1959).
47. Wilson, How the Police Chief Sees It, Harper's, April 1964, pp. 140, 143.
48. In areas where it is possible to predict which judge will be hearing
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where "judicial shopping" is a common practice), the only way they can
proceed with confidence is to avoid all practices which would be condemned
by any one of the group of judges sitting on the local court. This leads
to the police view that the limitations upon their authority must be
defined in terms of the most restrictive attitudes of the various judges.
The police thus find their authority defined more narrowly than is con-
templated by the statutes or appellate cases, and it may appear to them
that all possible means of evidence acquisition in certain cases have been
effectively blocked. The situation as it appears to the police, and the
probable police reaction thereto, has been aptly expressed as follows:
The inconsistent views of different judges ... thwart the police.
Some judges, for example, feel strongly that gambling raids should
not be made without search warrants even in public places where
gambling is openly observed. In an effort to comply with this
view, the police obtain search warrants based upon observations
made by plainclothes police who gain admission to gambling rooms
as patrons. Often, however, other judges will quash such search
warrants on the ground that the plainclothesmen should have an-
nounced the fact that they were policemen before entering the
gambling room. Because they failed to do this-in the view of
these judges-the police were "trespassers." Other judges may
concede that the plainclothesmen were not trespassers. But they
hold that observations of gambling made on one date do not
establish that gambling will be going on the following day when
the raid is made. Still other judges will hold that the grounds for
the search warrant are insufficient because the observations by
plainclothesmen are not corroborated and substantiated by "dis-
interested third persons."
All of these judges may be acting from the best of motives. But
their decisions result in a "what's the use?" attitude among police-
certain kinds of cases, the police may refrain from enforcement against certain
offenses which require resort to tactics disapproved by that judge:
"The influence of the court becomes most formalized when it is known in
advance which judge will hear a case on a given day-a situation most dramati-
cally illustrated in those communities in which judicial assignments are rotated
monthly. The attitudes, likes and dislikes of the different judges as they assume
the bench result in a monthly change of enforcement policies which is as identifi-
able as the turning of the calendar. On the evening of the last day of the month,
police attention may move abruptly from panderers and prostitutes to bookies and
burglars. The effect of the change in judges not only permeates the entire police
department, but provides habitual offenders with a reliable indication of the de-
gree of freedom with which they can engage in their chosen activities." Goldstein,
Police Decisions and Police Discretion in the Criminal 'Law Process (a paper
presented at the Third Dedicatory Conference of the University of Chicago Law
School, Jan. 7, 1960) p. 6 (mimeo.).
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men detailed to gambling and vice assignments. Finding them futile,
the police, unfortunately, tend to abandon efforts to suppress
gambling and vice by legal means. However, the continuing pres-
sure of their superiors and the fear of newspaper exposes force
them to make some attempt to suppress gambling and vice. So
they resort to harassing raids and arrests without warrants, with
little hope of successful prosecution in our courts. Thus a vicious
circle of contempt for law enforcement and the administration of
criminal justice is set up. The courts lose respect for the police;
the police lose respect for the courts; and the public loses respect
for both.49
Complete uniformity in the decisions of judges on police practices, of
course, is not possible, just as one cannot expect to train all police to
react in exactly the same (and correct) way to the variety of situations
with which they may be faced. Assessment of multifarious police actions
is a difficult task, particularly when sufficient guidance from statutes and
appellate cases is not always available50 Be this as it may, it seems obviously
desirable to minimize these inconsistencies. However, there has been little
effort to devise methods of achieving this objective."
4. Itconsistency Because of Nature of Defendant's Conduct
Observers of the activities of local courts have discerned that rulings
on police practices sometimes tend to vary depending upon the nature
of the crime with which the defendant is charged. Thus, "what is 'reasonable'
to a judge in a narcotics case is not 'reasonable' to the same judge in a
gambling case.15 2 Of course, it is probably true that the nature and serious-
ness of the conduct against which the police are proceeding does have
some legitimate bearing upon whether the actions of the police were proper. 3
49. Wilson, supra note 47, at pp. 143-44.
50. This lack will be discussed in Part IL
51. Notwithstanding the existence of the exclusionary rule in the observedjurisdictions for many years, there has apparently .been little effort by judges in
metropolitan courts to ascertain whether they are being at all consistent and
whether "judicial shopping" or other manifestations of inconsistency are impair-
ing the operation of the court.
More understandable, perhaps, is the fact that in states where exclusion first
became necessary because of Mapp trial judges initially were "at odds with their
fellow judges in applying the principles in practice." Spector, supra note 39, at 14.
52. Remarks of Kings County, N. Y., District Attorney Silver, in ABA,
SECTION OF CRIMINAL LAW, 1962 PROCEEDINGS 26-27 (1963).
53. The rationale of such a position is that a greater interference with in-
dividual liberty is warranted where the crime is of a very serious nature. Justice
Jackson expressed such a view when he said:
"If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnaped [sic] and the officers
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However, it is fair to say that in current practice it is not uncommon
for local judges to surpass this notion and base arrest and search rulings"
primarily upon personal attitudes concerning the defendant's conduct.
Trial judges, for one reason or another, may feel that it is undesirable
to convict certain of those who are, technically at least, guilty of some
criminal act. On some occasions this is a consequence of a feeling of
sympathy for the offender who, in the eyes of the judge, should not be
treated as a criminal.'5 Sometimes the desire is to avoid having to impose
severe penalties upon the defendant, which perhaps cannot be avoided if
he is convicted because of restrictions on the sentencing discretion of
throw a roadblock about the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it
would be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the search. The officers might be
unable to show probable cause for searching any particular car. However, I
should candidly strive hard to sustain such an action, executed fairly and in good
faith, because it might be reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity if it
was the only way to save a threatened life and detect a vicious crime. But I
should not strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal search to salvage a
few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger." Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (dissenting opinion). While the Restatement of Torts'
definition of the peace officer's privilege lists the seriousness of the offense as a
factor "to be considered in determining whether the actor's suspicion is sufficiently
reasonable," RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 119, comment i (1934), express recognition
of this by appellate courts is unusual. An exception is the following from United
States v. Kancso, 252 F.2d 220, 222 (2d Cir. 1958):
"The word 'reasonable' is not to -be construed in the abstract or in a
vacuum unrelated to the field to which it applies. Standards which might be rea-
sonable for the apprehension of -bank robbers might not be reasonable for the
arrest of narcotics peddlers."
There is evidence, however, that the seriousness of the offense actually plays
a part in an appellate court's determination of whether a given arrest and search
was valid. For example, the Michigan court has upheld an arrest for kidnapping
where made upon the sole basis that an officer had observed a car circling the
block with the occupants "apparently closely watching all onlookers," People v.
Minchella, 268 Mich. 123, 255 N.W. 735 (1934), but has declared invalid an
arrest for bootlegging made because the occupants of a car traveling very slowly
looked back at the motorcycle officer who passed them. People v. Roache, 237
Mich. 215, 211 N.W. 742 (1927).
54. The same can be said, for court rulings on aggressive police methods
which bear at least some resemblance to entrapment. Trial judges in current
practice do impose limitations upon police encouragement which are more re-
strictive than the law of entrapment, Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice
of .Encouragement, 49 VA. L. REv. 871 (1963). In many instances the basis of
the judge's rulings seems to be not so much a disapproval of the police methods
as it is a feeling that the defendant (often a prostitute or homosexual) should not
be convicted.
55. This may be the case, for example, when the defendant is being
prosecuted for soliciting or engaging in homosexual conduct. The judge may feel,
perhaps correctly, that prosecution and conviction will accomplish little or
nothing, and that it would be far better for the unfortunate defendant to receive
psychiatric treatment.
The police are usually equally sympathetic to the plight of such persons (as
opposed to transvestites, who are often viewed with contempt by the police and
[Vol. 30
18
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [1965], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol30/iss3/2
IMPROVING POLICE PERFORMANCE
the judge."' In still other cases the feeling may simply be that the offense
is not a serious one, r or considering the triviality of this kind of conduct,
that the police department is expending far too great a proportion of its
resources against it.s Sometimes these attiudes, if they were actually com-
municated to the police, would be acceptable to them;59 more often, how-
ever, because of the different perspective of and pressures upon the police
and local judiciary, agreement could not be expected. 60
Actual disclosure of these attitudes, however, even when they control
the disposition of the case before the judge, is the exception rather than
the rule. Sometimes the judge will merely find the defendant not guilty
notwithstanding the more than adequate evidence of guilt. 1' But, because
who may be subjected to a program of harassment by them. See LAFAVE, ARREST:
TaE DEcISIoN TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY ch. 23 (1965).). However, the
police are subjected to considerable pressure to act against other homosexual ac-
tivities, particularly when homosexuals congregate in facilities used by other
citizens or when they carry on solicitations in such places.
56. Or, the judge may be concerned about the collateral consequences, which
may be thought to be too severe under the circumstances. For example, con-
viction for gambling on licensed premises may be avoided where possible because
of an assumption that conviction would be followed by license revocation pro-
ceedings.
57. "Now, on the whole, judges are competent and upright men who can
be counted upon to uphold the law. For some reason, however, the dignity and
majesty of the law is not brought to bear in gambling cases. Perhaps this is
merely a reflection of the prevailing community attitude. For even in gambling
cases in which the syndicate is known to have a controlling interest, the courts
display a good-natured tolerance and leniency. Judges, it seems, do not compre-
hend the relationship between a single petty gambling violation and the
enormously lucrative racket which such violations, in aggregate, represent.
"For example, a keeper of a Chicago gambling house and six patrons were
recently arrested and brought before one of our local judges. After hearing the
case he remarked, 'Since there is wide-open gambling at race tracks, I don't
see why this court should convict anyone of gambling."' Wilson, supra note 47, at
142.
58. A trial judge in one large midwestern city acknowledged that there had
been open hostility between himself and the inspector in charge of the vice bureau
for approximately ten years. He was critical of the practice of the inspector in
charge of the vice bureau in assigning 28 men to the task of building, accosting,
and soliciting cases against prostitutes and homosexuals, as compared with the
22 men assigned to the homicide unit of the police department. The judge noted
that in his judgment the amount of vice to be found in the city was lower than
in any other city of comparable size in the country.
59. For example, should the judge be of the view that the adultery statute
need not be enforced, the police would undoubtedly agree. On police nonenforce-
ment in this area, see LaFave, The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law-Part
II, 1962 Wis. L. REv. 179, 197-99. On the general problem of the effect of suchjudicial attitudes on future enforcement practices, see LaFave, The Police and
Nonenforcement of the Law-Part I, 1962 Wis. L. REv. 104, 121-25.
60. See, for example, notes 55 and 57 sunpra.
61. Thus, in one case a Chicago judge forthrightly asserted: "The persons
arrested in this raid have broken the law by gambling and now I will break the
law by discharging them." Wilson, supra note 47, at 142.
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it is questionable whether it is the proper function of a trial judge to
acquit the guilty when there is sufficient admissible evidence of guilt,62
many judges prefer to seek other means of explaining the failure to convict.
In those cases in which the defendant moves for suppression of critical
evidence, the granting of the motion to suppress-even though the arrest
and search were within the requirements of law-serves this purpose well.
The use of the exclusionary rule in this way so as to avoid convicting
certain defendants further debilitates the exclusionary doctrine as a means
of enhancing the quality of future police performance. When, as is often
the case, the true objective of the judge escapes the testifying officer, the
incident is viewed merely as a condemnation of certain police arrest-search
practices which this judge or other judges have upheld on other occasions.
As with inconsistency between judges of multijudge courts, the result is
either confusion as to what the governing norms really are or else a belief
that the judiciary is incapable of adhering to a consistent pattern of
rulings in carrying out its police-supervising function. When the police do
begin to discern the true motives of the judge, the hostility between police
and court increases. The police, traditionally sensitive to criticism of their
The current practice with regard to judicial decisions not to convict the
guilty is explored and analyzed in detail in the forthcoming volume in the Ameri-
can Bar Foundation Survey of Criminal Justice series, NEwmAN, CoNvIcrioN:
THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNocENcE WrrIHoUT TRIAL.
62. Case law on this point is generally lacking. In State v. 'Evjue, 254 Wis.
581, 37 N.W.2d 50 (1949), the court observed that the appellate tribunal lacked
the power to review or reverse such decisions, but the concurring opinion labelled
the trial judge's action as "reprehensible."
In a California case the trial judge, without a prior motion or hearing, dis-
missed gambling complaints against a number of Negro defendants on the basis
that there was discriminatory enforcement 'by the police. Because California law
requires the listing of reasons for dismissal in an order entered upon the minutes
of the proceedings, these reasons were brought to the attention of the appellate
court, which commented:
"A judge dismissing criminal charges without trial upon his own motion
must record his reasons so that all may know why this great power was exercised
and such public declaration is indeed a purposeful restraint, lest magistral discre-
tion sweep away the government of laws.
"A dismissal 'in furtherance of justice,' upon review, must show that there
has been the exercise of a valid legal discretion, amounting to more than the
substitution of the predilections of a judge for the alleged predilections of the
peace officers." People v. Winters, 171 Cal. App.2d 876, 882, 342 P.2d 538, 542,
543 (1959).
It is probably fair to say that the trial judge has the power to acquit the
obviously guilty but that there exists no recognized discretion lodged within
the formal role of the judge to so use this power. However, the Model Penal Code
would expressly give to the trial judge the power to dismiss prosecutions for "de
minimis infractions" (as determined by the criteria listed in the statute) by filing
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action is based upon careful examination of the grounds for such action
by a impartial judicial officer, does not accord with the actual practice
in many locales. Particularly in large urban areas, judges often view their
warrant-issuing function as merely perfunctory in nature. Warrants are
issued by judges, often while they are engaged in trying cases or holding
preliminary examinations, with little or no attention to the question of
whether the complaint or affidavit meets the requirements of law. One
observer of this practice described it in this fashion:
All during the preliminary examinations this morning the judge
was signing arrest warrants. It was difficult for me to judge the
number of warrants signed, since this was going on while witnesses
in the preliminary examinations were being questioned. I noticed,
that the clerk would sometimes go to the opposite side of the
courtroom, administer the oath to the officer or complainant wishing
to have the warrant signed, and then, very quietly, take the warrant
to the bench for the judge's signature. This judge was not appre-
ciably bothered by this duty, since he merely signed his name to
the warrant while listening to the testimony of the witnesses in
other matters. The clerk, incidentally, administered the oath as
quietly as he could so that the proceedings would not be disturbed.
I would say that, between the hours of 9:30 and 11:00 a.m., the
judge signed ten or fifteen warrants.67
Essentially the same procedure has been observed when search warrants
were issued. Even when the judge was not engaged in other business at
the time, actual inquiry into the grounds for issuance of the warrant was
not undertaken.6s One result of this practice, of course, is that subsequently,
upon a motion to suppress, the evidence obtained incident to the service
67. From report of field researcher, American Bar Foundation Survey of the
Administration of Criminal Justice in the United States.
68. For example, this incident was reported by a field researcher for the
American Bar Foundation:
"After arriving in court, the police officer went directly to the court room
of the examining magistrate. The court was not in session, so the officer went to a
back room adjacent to the judge's chambers where a group of men were playing
cards. One of them said that the judge was on his way out of the building. The
officer returned to the hallway and found the judge about to board an elevator.
They exchanged a brief greeting with the officer extending the warrant toward
the judge. Without completely unfolding the document, and certainly without
reading it, the judge signed and returned it without any question. The officer
thanked him as the latter disappeared into the elevator. It appeared to me that
the only possible information which the judge could have learned about the case
from this transaction would be an inference that the defendant was involved in a
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operations, particularly object to the achievement of certain other (perhaps
worthwhile) objectives under the guise of disapproval of current law
enforcement techniques.
5. Inconsistency Between Before-the-Fact and After-the-Fact Supervision
Under existing arrest and search law the police are often allowed to
act without first obtaining a warrant from a judicial officer, even though
there is adequate time to actually obtain one. s It has been argued, however,
that in such circumstances the police should nevertheless secure a warrant
because "the duty of the police in our kind of society requires them to
follow that legal course which conforms most to democratic values,"" and
some of the writing for police consumption so recommends. 5 Yet, in current
practice warrants are actually obtained in a relatively small-but important
-percentage of cases. In some of these instances the warrant is necessary,
as where authority to arrest without warrant is lacking or where a search
of premises not incident to an arrest is desired. In other cases a warrant,
though not required, may be secured- because other factors have necessitated
a delay in police action or because the investment of time and effort in
an extended period of prior investigation makes it particularly desirable
that the case not be lost by exclusion of evidence.6
The assumption that resort to the warrant process prior to arrest or
search provides added, protection for the individual, in that the subsequent
63. The United States Supreme Court so held in United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56 (1950), and most state courts, usually citing Rabinowitz, have reached
the same conclusion.
64. Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, 172 (1953).
Not only is police action with warrant often considered the preferred alterna-
tive, 'but some would impose a more strict requirement than that pronounced in
Rabinowitz, supra note 63. One court has said that "while the ease and practicabil-
ity of obtaining the warrant of arrest" does not alone render an arrest without
warrant invalid, the "availability of the safeguards afforded by an impartial,judicial magistrate is a factor bearing on Teasonable, probable cause." Clay v.
United States, 239 F.2d 196, 204 (5th Cir. 1956); see also Carter v. United States,
314 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1963); Hopper v. United States, 267 F.2d 904 (9th Cir.
1959). And the view has recently been expressed by one commentator that it is
"imperative" that the fourth amendment be read as requiring a warrant for
arrest except in limited situations in which the exigencies of the situation do not
allow the taking of this step in advance of arrest. Broeder, Wong Sun v. United
States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. Ray. 483, 501 (1963).
65. E.g., Hotrrs, FRoM AutaSr To RELEASE 26 (1958): "No arrest should
ever be made except on the authority of a warrant of arrest if it is at all practica-
ble to obtain one."
66. For an extended discussion of the various reasons arrest warrants are
obtained when not needed, see LAFAvE, ARREST: THE DEcisioN To TAKE A SUSPEcT
INTo CuSTODY ch. 1 (1965).
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of such warrants may be excluded on the basis that the warrant in
question was not issued on adequate grounds.6 9
In other instances the judge may give the appearance of carrying out
his before-the-fact supervision of police action in that he will scrutinize the
complaint or affidavit or will examine the requesting officer before issuing
the warrant. However, the frequent quashing of these warrants on motions
to suppress makes it apparent that the standards applied to police action
before the fact and after the fact are not the same.70 The police are
understandably outspoken in their criticism of the repeated instances in
which a judge
may issue a search warrant based upon evidence which he believes
constitute probable cause. However, after the raid has been made
and the case comes before him for trial he may reverse himself
and hold that the grounds upon which he himself issued the search
warrant were insufficient. Thereupon he quashes the search warrant
and "suppresses" the evidence.-'
It is not clear why judicial officers have abdicated to the police their
authority to determine on a case-by-case basis whether an arrest warrant
or search warrant shall issue.72 Some judges may feel that the police
69. Usually this is done by showing that grounds for issuance of the warrant
were not present. However, it is also possible in some instances for defense
counsel to show that the proper procedure for warrant issuance was not followed.
For example, see Commonwealth v. Simmons, 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 120 (Phila. Co. Q.
Sess. 1961), where the trial court suppressed evidence obtained by a search war-
rant after the officer who obtained the warrant admitted he had not been put under
oath.
70. It is not here suggested that the mere fact a given warrant is ultimately
quashed shows that different standards are being employed. The probable cause
issue, of course, cannot be foreclosed by the fact it was once passed upon by the
warrant-issuing magistrate, and there will always be cases in which defense
counsel, at the motion to suppress, can show that the judge was in error in
issuing the warrant. However, considering the substantial number of warrants
quashed in this manner in some jurisdictions, it seems evident that the informa-
tion for warrants is not as severely tested at the time of issuance as at the sub-
sequent action to suppress the evidence.
71. Wilson, supra note 47, at 143.
'72. The practice was observed in a number of states which have long ad-
hered to the exclusionary rule. In states without the exclusionary rule prior to
Mapp v. Ohio, it is easier to understand how such a careless procedure might
have developed, although in one sense the judicial abdication under those circum-
stances was even more reprehensible because no subsequent vindication of the
rights of the individual searched incident to an improperly issued warrant was
possible.
"Search warrants have long been used under Pennsylvania practice, but the
formalities of their execution and substance were not scrutinized prior to the time
Pennsylvania became an exclusionary state under the mandate of Mapp. . ..
"Prior to 1961 it was commonplace to see police officers obtain search war-
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should be given a free hand to arrest and search, even though subsequent
conviction will thus be made impossible.7" The fact that the pressure of
other demands limits the available time of the judges, particularly in
metropolitan courts, may also be of significance. 74 The judges may rationalize
this abdication on the ground that the trial of contested cases, which they
view as their primary responsibility, will afford them an opportunity to
review the matter after the arrest and search have been made.
What is clear, however, is that the practice has a most undesirable
effect upon the operation of the criminal justice system generally, and
upon the functioning of the exclusionary rule in particular. For one thing,
the inconsistency between the standards applied when a warrant is requested
and when it is subsequently challenged further compounds the uncertainty
in the minds of the police as to what the legal norms governing their
conduct actually are. Somehow the requirements for a valid arrest warrant
or search warrant come out differently by the mere passage of a day or two.
Secondly, the repeated spectacle of a judge quashing a warrant that
he or one of his colleagues issued a few days earlier creates doubts in the
minds of the police both as to the abilities of the local judiciary to set
standards for police action and as to the reasons for excluding evidence.
The lack of concern with preventing illegal arrests and searches, as opposed
to excluding the fruits thereof after the event, strengthens the oft-held
police view that the courts are merely interested in freeing the guilty
and hampering law enforcement. If it were otherwise, reasons the con-
scientious officer, the judge would have indicated the deficiencies in the
information at the time when the warrant was requested (when the police
rants from magistrates at divisional police courts before hearings, without being
sworn and with very little, if any, information being given to establish probable
cause." Spector, Mapp v. Ohio: Pandora's Problems for the Prosecutor, 111 U. PA.
L. Rav. 4, 23-24 (1962).
73. Certain judges apparently approve of an informal program of repeated
arrests without conviction of certain offenders, such as gamblers, described infra
p. 422. In one case a judge, at a hearing on a motion to suppress, held that the
search warrant for a gambling place issued earlier by one of his colleagues was
insufficient. He then remarked to the writer in an approving tone, "The police
harass the hell out of these people."
74. It is in these same metropolitan areas that the need for careful atten-
tion to matters of arrest, search and seizure is greatest because of the volume
of crime and the nature of the enforcement task faced by the police. "At the
Pennsylvania District Attorneys' Association Conference, held on July 9 through
11, 1962, most of the county prosecutors stated that they had not been confronted
with a single problem on search and seizure in the year after the adoption of
the exclusionary rule in Mapp. On the other hand, metropolitan areas like Pitts-
burgh and Philadelphia have been inundated with search and seizure questions.'
Spector, supra note 72, at 43.
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might have been in a position to remedy the defect by further investigation)
instead of merely putting his temporary stamp of approval on a procedure
to be condemned a few days hence.
Finally, the judge's disinterest in exercising superintending control at
the time of warrant issuance largely renders ineffective what otherwise
would appear to be the course of action often dictated by the existence
of the exclusionary rule. The desired impact of this sanction upon the
concerned officer is that he will refrain from knowingly making illegal
searches and will, when possible, obtain prior judicial scrutiny of the
grounds for his action when he may be in doubt. However, he finds that even
when he resorts to what, in theory at least, is "that legal course which
conforms most to democratic values,"75 he has no real assurance that his
arrest or search will be lawful or that the evidence uncovered thereby can
be used to obtain a conviction.
6. Toward Improving the Police-Local Court Situation
Contested cases which involve rulings on evidence claimed to have
been illegally obtained call for the trial judge to decide whether the po-
lice action was proper and, to do so for the express purpose of affect-
ing police practice if found to be improper. In current practice, however,
the factors discussed above contribute to seriously impair the achievement
of this most worthwhile objective. Frequently the circumstances of the in-
dividual case are not adequately developed to provide a basis for a sound
ruling. When a decision is made there is often no effort to communicate
the reason to the officer involved. Marked inconsistencies between the
rulings of various trial judges on the same court, between the rulings
regarding evidence acquisition for different offenses, and between the
standards for before-the-fact and after-the-fact supervision of police all
contribute adversely to the operation of the system. They create further
ambiguity as to the governing legal norms, bolster police suspicions con-
cerning the ability of local courts to set police standards, and deter the
development in the minds of the police of proper attitudes concerning
the true role of the courts in performing this supervisory function. With the
judge not being completely familiar with the law enforcement problem
and the police being unaware of the basis for the trial judge's decision,
it would- indeed be surprising if this were to constitute an effective method
of supervising police behavior.
75. Hall, supra note 64.
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The problem clearly calls for better communication between the
various agencies in the criminal justice system. Currently police, prose-
cutors, and judges carry out their respective roles with little or no at-
tention to the impact of their actions on the other agencies or upon the
effective operation of the total system. Proposals directed toward "achiev-
ing teamwork between courts and law enforcement agencies ' ' 76 are, of
course, often viewed with suspicion because of the fear that the objective
is to determine "how the courts and the agencies can most effectively
gang up against the criminal accused and their attorneys." 77 This concern
is legitimate, and may mean that it would be unwise for trial judges to
become directly involved in police training programs. 78 However, the ex-
change of views between police, prosecutor, and court, if addressed to
the crucial problem of promoting the police-educating function of the
exclusionary rule, to the end of both improving law enforcement and
giving greater protection to those suspected of criminal behavior, does
not seem inappropriate.7 9 The obvious difficulty in developing a set of
clear standards for police conduct 0 is no excuse for avoiding the problem.
76. This was the title given to a panel discussion before the Criminal Law
Section of the American Bar Association a few years ago. Many of the participants
indicated their dissatisfaction with the title, and all felt constrained to observe
that they were not proposing any unholy alliance between the courts and enforce-
ment agencies, ABA, SECTION OF CRMIINAL LAW, 1962 PROCEEDINGS 9-40 (1963).
77. Id. at 10.
78. "Can or should judges take any part beyond their pronouncements in
particular cases to help law enforcement agencies avoid mistakes in arrest, deten-
tion, interrogation, and other procedures? .. .But only last August at the San
Francisco meeting of the American Bar Association a symposium was held on
the question whether direct participation of judges in the training of police
officers in the rules of the game was feasible. No conclusions were reached, al-
though if there was a concensus it seemed to me to be that the approach involved
too large a risk of public suspicion of unseemly cooperation between judges and
law enforcement agencies, and, so might create doubts of the impartiality ofjudges as between the government and the accused. Nevertheless this may be an
area well worth the thought and study of judges and their organizations such as
this one." Brennan, Judicial Supervision of Criminl Law Administration, 9 CRuME
AN DELINQUENCY 227, 228-29 (1963).
79. "I think it important that the courts come out of their 'ivory towers'
and sit down from time to time with the law enforcement people in their com-
munity and discuss some of these basic problems. It might 'be advisable, too, to
invite defense counsel and law professors to such conferences." Comment of Kings
County, N. Y., District Attorney Edward S. Silver, ABA, SECTION OF CRIMINAL
LAW, 1962 PROCEEDINGS 27 (1963).
80. Justice Brennan has observed "that unlike others of the amendments
making up the Bill of Rights, only the Fourth Amendment has in it the prohibi-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures. Perhaps there is a little more
difficulty in laying out guidelines outside the context of specific cases as to just
what it is that constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure. Heavens knows,
on the civil side, in centuries of effort, we have yet to agree on who is a 'reason-
[Vol. 30
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Rather, it indicates that careful attention to the means of realizing this ob-
jective is all the more important.
Each agency can also make a contribution by seeking improvements in
its own operation:
Police. The police without hesitation rail against the local judiciary
for the suppression of evidence in cases where they are convinced that,
to use police parlance, there was a "good pinch." What is too often
overlooked, however, is that the courts cannot make a fair appraisal of
facts without a careful presentation of all the relevant information which
led to the police action in a given case. Since police conduct often can
be characterized as "reasonable" only by consideration of the expertise
of the officers involved,"1 it is extremely important that police training
in the art of giving an accurate, complete, and understandable in-court
statement of the reasons action was taken be improved1 2 Similarly, further
able' man in measuring the standard of negligence and in other contexts of the
law ... " Id. at 40.
Professor Allen has cogently observed: "If, as we are told, hard cases make
bad law, one would expect much bad law in the search and seizure area; for the
cases are often hard, indeed. They are hard both because they place in sharp con-
flict interests of great and of the cost obvious importance and 'because of con-
fusion and inadequacy in the theory of the 'right of privacy."' Allen, The Ex-
clusionary Rule in the American Law of Search and Seizure, 52 J. CRaM. L., C & P.S.
246 (1961).
81. See LAFAvE, ARREST: TE DEcIsION To TAKE A SusPEcr INro CusToDY
ch. 12, section D (1965).
82. Chicago Police Department, Training Bulletin, vol. 5, nos. 7 & 8 (1964),
contains a good statement on an officer's responsibilities with regard to court
testimony and decorum. Included is the following:
"Your main function in court, like that of any other witness, is to supply the
pertinent facts, so that the court or jury may reach a just decision. Your testi-
mony simply tells what you saw or found out. The picture you present will be
sharp or fuzzy, depending upon your ability to present your facts clearly....
"Listen to the question being asked. Do not rush into the answer until you
are fully aware of what is called for. Wait until the attorney finishes the question.
If you do not understand the question, say so. It is quite proper to say, qI am
sorry, sir, I do not understand your question.' If you answer in a hurry, you may
rush into a serious mistake....
"You must testify with honesty and accuracy, regardless of its effect. The
court depends upon your testimony for its knowledge of the case. The judge's
decision to impose punishments or penalties on the defendant is based on your
testimony and that of other witnesses. No case ever justifies deviation from the
truth to obtain a conviction. You are a representative of the people and as such
have a responsibility to present the facts with complete impartiality...
"Think of your testimony as a chain of events in their order of occurrence.
This will help you keep your facts straight and the court to better understand
the situation as you describe it. Tell what you did, saw, or heard in proper
sequence. This will minimize confusion and misunderstanding on the part of your
listeners and make your testimony more interesting and effective." The Chi-
cago department has also issued a series of bulletins on the law of arrest, search
and seizure, and in-custody investigation which stresses the importance of not
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attention should be given to elevating the quality of arrest reports and
other police documents which may come before the trial judge or serve
as the sole background for the prosecutor's questioning of the officer.
Reports which deal only in conclusions or omit important facts, along
with those which unwittingly give the prior action an appearance of
illegality,83 increase the chances of exclusion.
In addition, police agencies need to give more attention to under-
standing exactly how their cases are disposed of in the local courts,
particularly those in which the prosecution is terminated by the exclusion
of critical evidence. Individual officers must learn that it is important
to discern the basis of local court rulings on their practices; the case that
is lost is not a total failure if thereby some added understanding of arrest
and search law can be acquired. Moreover, by the use of their court of-
ficers or other means, police departments need to obtain an accurate
overall picture of the reasons for their successes and failures before local
courts. This information, now seldom available, could be used to determine
the deficiencies in police training, to provide the grounds for a high-level
exchange of viewpoints with the local judiciary, and to determine what lower
court limitations should be brought to the attention of the appellate courts.8 4
Prosecution. In current practice there is considerable uncertainty as
to the proper role of the prosecuting attorney. He may be viewed pri-
marily as trial counsel for the police department, reflecting the views of the
department in his court representation; as a sort of "house counsel" for
the police, giving legal advice to the department on how to develop en-
forcement practices which will withstand challenge in court; as a repre-
only complying with the law but also reporting and testifying in a fashion which
will make the compliance apparent. Chicago Police Department, Training Bulletin,
vol. 5, nos. 1-17 (1964).
83. For example, sometimes an arrest report will include a declaration by the
officer that he searched the suspect, found certain contraband, and then placed
him under arrest. In some instances the report may be accurate, in that the ar-
resting-searching officer did not understand the necessity, absent extraordinary
circumstances, of making the arrest before the search. In other instances, however,
the actual situation may have been one in which the officer's actions prior to the
search actually constituted an arrest, though he failed to consider it or report
it as such.
84. In jurisdictions where the prosecution can appeal from the suppression
of evidence, limitations on the resources of the prosecutor's office allow for appeal
of only a small percentage of cases in which it is thought the trial judge erred.
The tendency is for the prosecutor to appeal only the cases involving serious
crimes, but, from the police point of view it may be preferable to appeal a specific
minor case which is representative of a great volume of cases in which evidence
has been suppressed, perhaps erroneously, because local judges do not approve of
a specific, common law enforcement practice.
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sentative of the court, with the responsibility of enforcing rules designed
to control the police; or as an elected official who will try to reflect com-
munity opinion in deciding when to prosecute. Although most prosecutors'
offices may be engaged to a certain degree in all these functions, the
staff ordinarily does not have occasion to review or evaluate existing law
enforcement policies and practices. The attention of the prosecutor is
usually focused, on individual cases of assumed major importance, while
his often overworked and, inexperienced s' assistants find that all of their
time is needed in determining charges, preparing for and appearing at trials,
and conducting the routine business of the office.
Although it might be said that the prosecutor does perform the trial
counsel function, the difficulty is that, when certain police practices are
brought into question in the court, the prosecutor is not likely to be in
position to articulate the relevant problems as they appear to the police.
This is because he is relatively detached, from the day-to-day problems
of the police and from the enforcement practices which gives rise to the
legal issue in court. It does not appear inconsistent with the prosecutor's
obligation to refrain from utilizing the fruits of police illegality', to sug-
gest that, as with counsel for a private client, the prosecutor should
consult fully with his police "client" and attempt to represent their views
in court more adequately. A prosecutor who did understand the prob-
lems of the police would not only be in a better position to focus the
attention of the trial courts on the true nature of the issues before them,
but also could better decide what issues are in greatest need of clarifi-
cation from the appellate courts8 7
There is uncertainty as to what agency has responsibility for serving
as "house counsel" for the police. Although some prosecutors have as-
sumed this function, in many locales communication between the police
and prosecution agencies is almost nonexistent. The police, if in need
of a "legal advisor," are expected to deal with the city attorney or mu-
85. See Kuh, Careers in Prosecution Offices, 14 J. LEGAL ED. 175, 176-78
(1961), on the turnover in the New York County District Attorney's office
and the problems caused thereby.
86. "It is the duty of the prosecutor to know not only whom to prosecute, but
wkens.... Unhesitatingly he should refuse to go forward with the presentation of
evidence which has been obtained by illegal police invasion of a private home. If
his case depends upon such evidence, he should dismiss the prosecution. If he can
present a case without the use of evidence illegally procured, it should not be
offered." Williams v. United States, 263 F.2d 487, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (Danaher,
J., concurring).
87. See supra note 84.
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nicipal corporation counsel, although these officers do not have responsi-
bility for the trial of criminal cases or for arguing the propriety of police
practices on appeal. To the extent that local court rulings are more
understandable to the law-trained assistant prosecutor than to the testi-
fying officer, the prosecutor's office may be in the best position to improve
police cognizance of them. Also, as long as courts continue to refrain
from advising the police on the legality of their action before-the-fact,
review of warrant requests by the prosecutor's office may be desirable1s
Courts. The urgency of disposing of the host of cases on the trial
docket leaves little opportunity for many trial judges to stand back and
view the product of their work and its consequences. Such self-appraisal,
however, is urgently needed. Some thought should be given to whether
the police-supervising, police-educating function of the court is being
realized- or can be realized under existing procedures. 9 In the long run,
it would seem, more judicial energies would be conserved by striving for
improvements rather than by continuing on the present treadmill of
repeated exclusion without any appreciable effect upon police practice.
One police administrator who devoted considerable effort to improv-
ing the training of his men on arrest, search and seizure commented,
"Now if we could only teach the judges." The criticism may be unwar-
ranted, but it does seem fair to say that judges on metropolitan courts
should evince some concern over attaining a measure of uniformity in
88. In a few jurisdictions the law allows or contemplates involvement of the
prosecutor in the warrant issuance process. See MicH. STAT. AN. § 28.860 (1954);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 954.01 (1958).
89. Perhaps some attention should be given to changing the procedures
themselves. As noted earlier, one difficulty in current practice is that often ex-
clusion of evidence occurs without any clear statement of the basis for the decision.
Consider, in this regard, the following proposal of the Chicago Crime Commission:
"For years, criminals in Illinois have avoided conviction by persuading a
court to 'suppress' the evidence against them on the ground that it was obtained
by police officials through an unlawful search and seizure. While recognizing that
citizens should be protected in their constitutional Tight against unlawful invasions
of privacy, the Crime Commission is concerned that too broad interpretation of
this privilege has resulted in unwarranted protection for criminals.
"An important step to limit abuse of the privilege by a careless or uninformedjudge was taken when the state legislature recently authorized the state to
appeal from the granting of a motion to suppress evidence on the ground of im-
proper search. Unfortunately, however, the abuse still continues-in many cases
because of the time and expense involved in prosecuting an appeal.
"The Crime Commission now proposes an additional legislative step to pre-
vent a judge from taking hasty and ill-conceived action in suppressing evidence of
crime. It is suggested that whenever a judge rules on a motion to suppress evi-
dence on the ground that it was illegally seized, he shall file written findings of
fact and conclusions of law in support of his order.
"This legislation will force the judge to place on the record the reasons
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their views regarding police conduct. Even if they were only concerned
with the impact of their inconsistencies on in-court tactics ("judicial shop-
ping" and' the like) it would seem that the need for efforts in this direction
is apparent.90
Some of the problems defy easy solution. As long as judges continue
to feel that certain criminal conduct should not result in conviction, and
as long as the suppression of critical evidence is used to attain this
(perhaps desirable) end, police supervision by the courts will suffer. Per-
haps express recognition of some judicial authority to acquit the guilty,
along the lines of the Model Penal Code proposal,91 would help. Similarly,
attaining a measure of consistency between before-the-fact and after-
the-fact supervision cannot be easily accomplished. Resolution of these
problems may require some reorientation of the entire system.
C. ENFORCEMENT WITH OBJECTIVES OTHER THAN CoNvicTiox
The assumption underlying the exclusionary rule is that the police
will not deliberately engage in an unreasonable search and seizure if
they know that the fruits thereof cannot be used to obtain a conviction
of the offender. In many instances the assumption is justified; the police,
for example, are not likely to jeopardize the case against a suspected
murderer by acquiring evidence against him through means they know
are almost certain to require its exclusion.92 By the same token, however,
for his ruling and provide the prosecutor, the observers and the appellate courts
with an opportunity to measure the judge's ruling against existing law to see if
he has erred by going too far in favor of either prosecution or defense.
"It is also suggested that this provision, by requiring trial judges to support
their decisions by a written statement, will induce those few who have not
thoroughly studied the applicable law to do so before rendering an off-hand ruling
ruling that may ruin an otherwise successful prosecution. CHICAGO CRIME COM-
MISSION, A TWELvE-PoINT LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM FOR ILLINOIS 17 (1964).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-12(e) was recently amended to require that "the
order or judgment granting or denying the motion [to suppress] shall state the
findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which the order or judgment is
based." H.B. 151, 74th Gen. Ass. (Ill. 1965).
90. Conferences of judges for the purpose of insuring uniformity in sentencing
are now the vogue. Similar meetings might be held for the purpose of realizing
greater uniformity in police supervision.
91. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
92. That is, assuming the absence of corruption. It has been noted that one
argument made against the exclusionary rule is that it "gives an ordinary police-
man the power to confer immunity upon an offender. By overstepping the bounds
of the law, a policeman's action can place vital evidence beyond the reach of the
prosecution." Paulsen, The Exclutsionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police,
52 J. CIUM. L., C. & P.S. 255, 256 (1961). See People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 23,
150 N.E. 585, 588 (1926).
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the threat of exclusion will not deter if conviction is not the principle
objective of the police. The exclusionary rule has an impact "only in
those situations in which the police are proceeding with the conscious
purpose of securing evidence to use in prosecuting the defendant."9' This
limitation takes on considerable importance when one considers that "the
desire to obtain convictions . . . constitute[s] . . . only a part of the ex-
planation for American police misconduct. '9 4
1. Some Current Police Practices
It is currently the practice in some locales, particularly in large
urban centers, for the police to make arrests and to conduct searches
under circumstances which they know in advance will make conviction
of the offenders involved impossible. These tactics are used primarily
against violators of the gambling and liquor laws, but also are employed
in sections of the community that have a particularly serious crime problem.
a. Gambling and Liquor Law Violations
Although social gambling is not a matter of concern to police8 5 a
large share of available law enforcement resources is devoted to the
suppression of professional gambling, which is a major activity of or-
ganized crime. In most metropolitan areas, one of the major forms of
gambling, especially among minority and low-income groups, is a daily
lottery commonly referred to as policy or numbers.96 Operation of a
particular numbers syndicate or policy wheel requires an elaborate or-
ganization of bet takers ("writers"), runners ("bagmen"), and clerks ("of-
fice workers")." The gross annual play on policy and numbers has been
93. Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment,
1960 Sup. CT. REv. 46, 55.
94. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961
Sup. Or. Ray. 1, 37.
95. Even if it is included within the gambling statute, which is often the case,
police routinely refuse to arrest for such conduct. See LaFave, The Police and
Nonenforcement of the Law-Part II, 1962 Wis. L. REv. 179, 192-94.
96. See, generally, Peterson, Obstacles to Enforcement of Gambling Laws,
269 Annals 9 (1950); 1 ABA COMM'N oN ORGANIZED CR IE, ORGANIZED CRIME AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT 11 (1952); Hearings on H.R.3024, HIR. 8410 and S. 1658 Before
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1962); Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 69 Before Permanent Subcommittee on In-
vestigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1961); Hearings on H.R. 468 Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
97. Although it is common for the terms "policy" and "numbers" to -be used
interchangeably, the police usually use them to describe two different forms of
lottery. In each case, the bets are small, usually from ten cents to a dollar. In
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estimated conservatively at one billion dollars.9 8 Other forms of gambling,
such as bookmaking or the operation of a gaming room, may be small
operations but usually are associated with an organized criminal syn-
dicate. Horse books gross from three to five billion dollars a year, 9 and
many millions also are bet annually in other kinds of gambling establish-
ments. The illegal manufacture and sale of liquor is sometimes an inde-
pendent undertaking, but often is an integral part of a syndicate operation.
In some areas, the police frequently arrest persons involved in pro-
fessional gambling or illegal liquor sales without any intention of sub-
jecting them to prosecution or of even bringing the case to the prose-
cutor's attention. Subject to this procedure are the owners, operators,
and frequenters of places where gambling or illegal liquor sales occur,
bookies, numbers or policy writers and carriers, liquor carriers, and sim-
ilar persons. The number of offenders in these categories who are handled
in this way may greatly exceed those who are actually prosecuted; for
example, in a precinct of one large city in which gambling and liquor
violations are a serious problem, a total of 592 gambling arrests were
made in a six month period, but only 24 of these resulted in prosecution.
In the same period, 420 arrests were made for violation of the liquor
laws, but only 36 cases were prosecuted.
Police action of this type against liquor or gambling places may
result from a specific complaint100 but more often these places are dis-
playing numbers, the bettor selects a three-digit number between 000 and 999,
and the winning number is determined on the basis of some statistic reported
daily, such as certain digits of the total amount of money bet at a particular
race track on that date. While the actual odds are 1000 to 1, most syndicates pay
at 600 or 500 to 1. In policy, the player selects a series of three two-digit numbers,
and the winners are determined by an actual drawing of a series of numbers(how many are drawn varies from wheel to wheel, but usually it ranges between
6 and 12 different two-digit numbers). Big winners are those persons who have
had all three of their numbers drawn; they may be paid at odds as high as 6,000
to 1 (as is true of the "Super Chief" wheel in Chicago) or as low as 400 to 1 (as
is true of the "Panama Limited" wheel in Chicago), depending of course on the
number of different two-digit numbers drawn by the wheel they are playing.
Players are notified of the numbers drawn by each wheel (most have two draw-
ings daily) by the distribution of "hit slips."
For a more detailed description, see 1 ABA COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME,
ORGANIZED CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 91-94 (1952); Jacoby, The Forms of
Gambling, 269 Annals 39, 43-45 (1950).
98. ABA COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, ORGANIZED CRIME AND LAW ENFORCE-
MENT 94 (1952).
99. Id. at 79. For a more detailed description of bookmaking operations, see
Lawrence, Bookmaking, 269 Annals 46 (1950).
100. In one case a man called the precinct, identified himself, and stated that
a noisy party was going on in the apartment below and that he could hear gam-
bling. Armed with this information, the cleanup squad went to the address,
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covered by surveillance of suspected establishments. Following is a report
of a typical raid:
Passing by the establishment at approximately 1:00 a.m., the
cleanup squad'o' officers observed two men who were probably
serving as lookouts in the shoe shine parlor in front of this build-
ing. The officers traveled, around the block and then pulled into
an alley. Two of them walked in the front of the establishment,
the shoe shine parlor, while the other two men stationed themselves
at the rear door. Through the door, they could hear a large number
of voices. This reporter waited at the rear of the establishment
together with the sergeant and one of the other members of the
cleanup crew.
In very short order, the door was opened by one of the
other officers. There was a large round table in the center of this
back room with 32 people gathered around it. There were cards on
the table, but there was no money present. The sergeant theorized
that the money was removed as soon as one of the lookout men
had seen the officers. Although the officers operate in plain clothes,
they are usually well known to professional gamblers in the neigh-
borhood. Those present in the room continued to engage in their
card game, though with the absence of cash at the table.
The sergeant then ordered that everybody in the room turn
toward the wall. With two officers starting at each end of the
lineup, they began to search for concealed weapons. On finding a
jack-knife they removed it and threw it onto the center of the
table. Approximately 50 jack-knives were found, but no other type
of weapon. With the search of all 32 individuals completed, the
officers then went through the line again taking down the name,
address, birth date, and sex of each of the individuals in the room.
In the meantime, one of the officers had radioed for a patrol wagon.
The patrol wagon arrived and was backed up to the rear door
of the establishment. A large number of people had, gathered out-
listened at the door, and then without notice broke in and seized the cards, dice,
and money. All twelve persons were arrested. The woman in possession of the
apartment was booked for investigation of violation of the gambling laws, and
instructions were left to release her in the morning. The others were lectured and
sent on their way after a time, except that those with outstanding traffic warrants
had to post the amount due prior to release.
101. In this particular municipality, six to eight officers are assigned to a
cleanup squad in pach precinct. These officers work in plainclothes under the di-
rection of the inspector in charge of the precinct. They are considered a precinct
vice squad whose primary function is to enforce gambling and liquor laws. While
the cleanup squads appear to devote most of their efforts to arrest and search
without thought of prosecution, other agencies in the department are engaged
in the more elaborate, extensive, and time-consuming investigations necessary for
actual prosecution of gambling and liquor law violators.
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side to inquire about their relatives. The sergeant instructed all
of them to leave or they too would be placed in the wagon. Fifteen
of the 32 people were then placed in the wagon and driven to
precinct headquarters. At the precinct these individuals were
placed in the bull pen. The wagon then returned to pick up the
others.
At precinct headquarters no effort was made to book these
individuals. The cleanup squad instead listed them in their report
and phoned the names in to the administrative unit of the traffic
division in order to determine whether or not there were any
traffic warrants outstanding on them. As a result of this check,
four individuals were detained on outstanding traffic warrants.
The clean-up squad also detained the owner of the premises and the
individual who was operating the game. The 26 other persons
were taken out of the bull pen at 2:15 a.m. and released.102
The situation is much the same in other instances in which the police
gain entry to a place where it is known or thought that a considerable
number of persons are involved in illegal activity. Such a raid may be
directed at handbooks,oa "blind pigs,1 4 or places where there are
professionally operated card games or gambling devices.
Similar tactics are employed against inside gambling activity that
is even more secretive because there are no walk-in customers. For ex-
ample, a bookie may operate a "wireroom" in which he receives and
lays off bets via telephone. A numbers or policy operation must have
an "office," a place to which all bets and money are delivered' and at
which detailed record-making occurs for the purpose of determining win-
ners and the amounts owed by and to the various runners and writers.
In both the "wireroom" and the "office," many precautions are taken
to prevent police entry without use of force and to make the destruc-
tion of evidence possible should forced entry be attempted.10,5 The police
make forcible entries into these premises and arrest the bookies and "office
workers" without thought of obtaining their conviction.
Persons in the lower echelons of the numbers or policy syndicates,
102. The report is by a field researcher for the American Bar Foundation Sur-
vey of the Administration of Criminal Justice.
103. The handbook is a -bookie operation which has walk-in customers.
Often great precautions are taken to insure that only regular customers can gain
entrance. Some handbooks have -fairly modest arrangements; others are elaborate-
ly equipped with odds boards and a battery of communications devices.
104. These are establishments at which liquor is sold illegally.
105. See note 127 infra.
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that is, persons who write and carry the bets, also frequently are arrested.
The police suspect certain persons of being "writers" or "bagmen" either
because of their past records or because of their suspicious actions. They
are stopped on the street and searched, and if evidence of gambling is
found they are arrested. Similarly, persons suspected of carrying illegal
liquor are stopped, searched, and then detained if the search discloses
illegal liquor.
In these cases, it is common practice to seize not only the illegal
liquor or gambling paraphernalia but also telephones, money, and auto-
mobiles when it appears they have some connection with the offense for
which the arrest is made. Although it is usually known at the time of
arrest that conviction is probably impossible (because the necessary
evidence is not available or would be excluded), disposition of these cases
varies from place to place and, to a certain extent, from offense to offense.
Lesser offenders, such as the mere frequenters of gambling places or
"blind pigs," are often detained a few hours and then released. In some
locales the standard practice is for professional operators, particularly
those with syndicate connections, to obtain their release via a writ of
habeas corpus; 108 actual prosecution is not even undertaken. By contrast,
in other areas these cases are actually brought to court, where they are
ordinarily disposed of by suppression of evidence or a finding that there
is not sufficient evidence of the illegal activity to convict. From observa-
tion of these cases in court it is apparent that the police have no expecta-
tion that there will be a conviction. Little or no effort is made toward
that end; police "testimony seems calculated to insure the exclusion of
the seized evidence, or at least to save time in disposing of a case in
which the search is obviously illegal."'
1 0 7
106. For example, when a "bagman" fails to make his rounds it is presumed
by the syndicate that he has been picked up, so a writ of habeas corpus is prompt-
ly obtained. Thus, in one case a carrier was arrested at 1:50 p.m. and the officers
arrived at the vice bureau with him at 2:19. At 2:38 an attorney called to inquire
about the carrier, and at 2:47 the lieutenant was notified of the writ, and a -hear-
ing set at 3:15.
Because of this prompt action by the syndicate in some areas, it is not un-
common for a writ to be issued on a person who has not been arrested. The
action is taken when a "bagman" does not appear at a particular pick-up station
at or shortly after the appointed time, which sometimes occurs because he has
been caught in a traffic jam.
107. Comment, 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 493, 498 (1952). See also Dash, Cracks in
tke Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REV. 385, 391 (1951).
For example, on a motion to suppress in a case involving a "bagman" the
officer usually will concede that he searched first and arrested second, and either
will give no grounds for his action or will say that the defendant was a "known
police character" or a "known policy man."
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b. Aggressive Street Patrol in High-Crime Areas
The crime problem facing the police in large metropolitan centers
is, of course, far more serious than elsewhere. And, within these cities
the crime rate is particularly high in certain sections-usually overcrowded
slums-where the factors contributing to crime are most prevalent. Po-
lice concern with the crime problem in these sections of the city often
is manifested by using aggressive patrol techniques in such places.
The number of regular precinct personnel available to answer calls
for police service is naturally higher in the high-crime sections of the
community. °s Beyond this, however, many departments deploy a special
force into these areas during certain critical periods of the day. These
police ordinarily do not respond to calls for service, but rather have the
sole responsibility of engaging in aggressive street patrol. Although these
officers are expected to be on the alert for certain persons wanted in
connection with past crimes,1O9 most of their activity is directed toward
persons engaging in suspicious conduct and other persons who, while
not acting in a suspicious manner, have engaged in some conduct that
affords an excuse for police inquiry.
Officers assigned to this duty usually patrol with two men to a car.
If they see a pedestrian who "looks kinky," they may stop and question
him and perhaps subject him to a frisk or a full search."1° This procedure
is employed without regard to whether the law of the jurisdiction allows
"field interrogation" and frisk under suspicious circumstances, or whether,
if the law does so provide, the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to
justify the action."" It is also common practice to stop a moving vehicle,
108. Until recent years the distribution of police personnel in many cities was
most unsound in that the force was distributed evenly among three eight-hour
shifts and among beats of equal area. Now, however, most large departments
attempt to obtain maximum results by uneven distribution, based upon time-place
studies of past criminal conduct. See WILsoN, POLIc E ADMINISTRATION ch. 13 (2d
ed. 1963).
109. These officers study carefully the pictures and word descriptions of
wanted persons listed in the daily bulletin, and are continually on the alert for
them. In addition, they keep at hand the latest "hot sheet," listing the license
numbers of stolen automobiles, and check many of the cars in the area against it.
110. For example, on one occasion officers observed a young man walking
down the street wearing a raincoat. It was not and had not been raining, and the
temperature was extremely high. The officers stopped this individual, asked him
why he was about, checked to see if he had- any weapons or property hidden
under the coat, and then had him remove the coat in order to determine if he
was wearing it to conceal "tracks" on his arms from taking narcotics.
111. "Field interrogation" is the term police use to describe the stopping
and questioning of suspicious persons. A frisk ordinarily is distinguished from a
full-fledged search in that the former involves a patting down of the person for
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question the driver as to his reasons for being about, frisk the driver and
sometimes other occupants of the car, and search the car. Sometimes this is
done because of the driver's generally suspicious conduct, such as an apparent
attempt to elude a following patrol car, or a "double-take" at a patrol
car headed in another direction. More often, however, these stops are
based upon some minor offense by the driver, such as a burned out tail
light, absence of license or city permit sticker, or a moving traffic violation.
Arrest or citation for the minor offense does not occur except when the
search is fruitful or the driver is argumentative. Although basing the
search on the minor violation may be expressly prohibited by the law of
the jurisdiction,112 this violation serves as a means of justifying to the
suspect the stopping and subsequent investigation.
The disposition of these cases also varies from place to place and
from case to case. If a search uncovers a concealed weapon, sometimes
seizure of the weapon is the only action taken; if the individual voices
any objection, he may be told that he could be prosecuted and convicted.
It is more common, however, for the offender to be arrested. In some
locales he may be able to terminate the case by a writ of habeas corpus,
although this is unlikely unless he is a syndicate employee. Most cases
go to trial, although here again it is a foregone conclusion in most instances
that conviction is not possible because the weapon, stolen property, or
whatever else was found will be suppressed. Only in a relatively few cases,
where the offense uncovered is serious and it is thought some convinc-
ing explanation can be given for the police conduct, is it subsequently
decided to treat the case as one in which conviction is a serious objective. 13
the purpose of determining whether he is carrying a concealed weapon. Some
states have authorized field interrogation under certain circumstances by statute
or case law, and some also allow the officer to frisk for his own protection. See
Remington, The Law Relating to "On tire Street" Detention, Questioning and
Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General, 51 J. Crai.
L., C. & P.S. 386 (1960); LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECr
INTO CUSTODY 344-47 (1965). A forthcoming volume of the American Bar Founda-
tion Administration of Criminal Justice series, entitled DETECTI N OF CRIME,
will explore the problems in this area in considerable detail.
112. Not so many years ago, it could be said that full search of a car incident
to a traffic arrest was accepted by most appellate courts as a proper enforcement
technique. This was because of a tendency for these courts to take a rather
mechanical approach, assuming that a lawful arrest for any offense would allow a
search even if the offense was not one for which it could be expected that a weap-
on, evidence, or fruits of that crime might ,be found. See Note, 1959 Wis. L. REv.
347. In the last few years, however, more and more appellate courts have con-
demned the practice and excluded evidence found by following it. Illustrative is
People v. Watkins, 19 Ill.2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960).
113. For example, in one case officers stopped a car because it lacked a rear
license plate. As they approached, the car, two of the occupants exited from the
[Vol. 30
38
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [1965], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol30/iss3/2
IMPROVING POLICE PERFORMANCE
Why do police make arrests and searches in cases where prosecution
will not even be attempted or, if attempted, will clearly result in ac-
quittal or dismissal? One reason is that conviction or meaningful convic-
tion for certain crimes is thought to be an unattainable objective, either
because of judicial reluctance to convict or to impose meaningful sen-
tences, or because of an inability of the police to uncover sufficient ev-
idence by acceptable means. Secondly, in the police view there is consider-
able public and other pressure for some official action against the criminal
activity involved. 'Finally, the police feel that arrest and its attendant
circumstances, even if not followed by conviction, accomplish certain
desirable objectives.
2. Reasons for the Practice: Conviction or
Meaningful Conviction Thought Impossible
a. Judicial Reluctance to Convict or Impose Meaningful Sentence
In some communities many trial judges display a higher degree of
leniency in what they characterize as "minor gambling cases" than they
do in most other cases. Presumably this is a reflection of the views of
at least a certain segment of the community regarding the offense of
gambling. The police, of course, are highly critical of this judicial attitude,
and contend that judges who react in this way apparently "do not
comprehend the relationship between a single petty gambling violation
and the enormously lucrative racket which such violations, in aggregate,
represent."-tl*
One way this leniency may be manifested is by acquittal of the
offender who has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Illustra-
tive is the reported comment of one trial judge when the keeper and six
patrons of a gambling house were brought before him: "Since there is wide-
open gambling at race tracks, I don't see why this court should convict
anyone of gambling. The persons arrested in this raid have broken the
vehicle and fled. The officers were unable to catch them, but they did prevent
the driver from fleeing and subjected him to a search. In the car they found
mail addressed to a number of different persons residing in a particular two-block
area of the city. Many of the envelopes, all of which 'had been opened, contained
welfare checks. In the driver's pockets were a number of social" security cards
from which the original names and signatures had been erased; these, of course,
would be filled in with names matching the stolen checks and then would be used
for purposes of identification in cashing the checks. It was decided that the
driver should be turned over to the federal authorities for prosecution.
114. Wilson, How the Police Chief Sees It, Harper's, April 1964, pp. 140, 142.
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law by gambling and now I will break the law by discharging them."115
Although acquittal of the guilty may constitute improper conduct by the
trial judge, it is of course a decision that is not subsequently subject
to reversal.'1"
If the judge does convict, he may be most lenient in the imposition
of sentence. Although some concern has been expressed over whether the
maximum penalties provided in the gambling statutes are high enough,1 17
the fact remains that often the actual punishment imposed is merely a
small fine far short of the statutory maximum18 In the police view, the
sentences commonly imposed in gambling cases are inadequate for two
reasons. First, they are not sufficient to deter:
115. Ibid.
116. In most jurisdictions, the state cannot appeal from an acquittal. Such
an appeal is possible in Wisconsin to challenge rulings adverse to the state on
questions of law, and in one case the prosecution challenged, the trial judge's
finding the defendant not guilty, claiming that the evidence pointed conclusively
to defendant's guilt. Said the court:
"We consider that this court has no power under the statute or constitution
to review the merits of the acquittal or to reverse the judgment.
"We appreciate that this conclusion puts out of the reach of an appeal by
the state purely arbitrary findings of not guilty by trial judges in the face of the
facts and the law but we are confident that instances of this sort will be rare.
In any case neither the statute nor the constitution authorizes intervention by
this court and the matter must therefore rest with the conscience of the trial
judge in the light of his oath of office. We are satisfied that upon waiver of jury
trial 'his decision stands upon the same footing as the verdict of a jury." State v.
Evjue, 254 Wis. 581, 594, 37 N.W.2d 50, 56 (1949).
117. In Illinois gambling is punishable by a fine up to $500 and imprisonment
up to one year, or both. Subsequent convictions for most forms of gambling
may result in a fine up to $1000 or imprisonment up to three years, or both. ILL.
Rm. STAT. ch. 38, § 28-1 (1963). Observed the Superintendent of Police of Chi-
cago:
"We also hope to persuade the legislature that it is absurd to classify vast
and lucrative rackets, such as gambling and vice operations, as mere misdemeanors,
punishable by a small fine and brief imprisonment. The law now makes no distinc-
tion between the friendly poker game in the privacy of one's home and the vast
city-wide numbers racket grossing millions of dollars a year...
"[Tlhe Chicago Police Department had a 'bill introduced at the last session
of the legislature which would establish the crime of syndicated gambling and
make it a felony punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary...
"[Ilt was permitted to languish and die on the calendar in the closing days
of the session." Wilson, supra note 114, at 144-45. See also CHIcAGO CRIME COM-
MISSION, A TWELVE-POINT LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM FOR ILLINOIS 3-4 (1964).
118. I have reported the Detroit experience elsewhere as follows:
"While penalties up to one year in jail or a fine of $500 are possible, Micn.
STAT. ANN. §§ 28.533 to 28.547 (1949), the courts are not disposed to levying
such penalties. In fact, because of the low sentences received, the present practice
is to charge gamblers under the disorderly persons statute, MIcH. STAT. ANN.
§ 28.364 (1949), the maximum for which is 90 days or $100 fine or both, as it is
known that no greater sentence would result. If the offender is engaged in gambling
for a profit, he customarily receives only a money fine, and if he is a frequenter of a
gambling place, he will most likely receive a suspended sentence. Detroit Police
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A well-organized and productive gambling house or numbers
racket could take in one quarter of a million dollars each week.
If, after a long and vigorous period of investigation and observation,
the defendant was charged with violating the gambling laws and
convicted, the resulting punishment is so obviously weak and un-
prohibitive that the defendants are willing to shell out a relatively
small fine or serve a relatively short time in jail. The gamblers
and numbers men confidently feel that the odds are in their favor.
If they operate for six months or a year, and accumulate untold
thousands of dollars from the illegal activity, then the meager
punishment imposed upon them if they are caught is well worth
it."
i 9
Secondly, and this is in part reflected by the above reference to "a long
and vigorous period of investigation," the police tend to evaluate the
sufficiency of the sentence by weighing it against the amount of police
resources necessary to bring about conviction. 2 0 If the penalty ultimately
imposed is insignificant when weighed against the time and effort which
has gone into building the case, the police question whether it is worth
the effort to confine their detection practices to those which will allow
conviction.
The police also complain that in some cases conviction is impossible
because of "loopholes" in the law. However, it is questionable whether
the problem is so much attributable to deficiencies in the legislative pro-
scription as it is to the fact that trial judges sometimes declare the
relevant statute inapplicable to provide a basis for acquittal. Gambling
statutes, for example, typically are drafted broadly to avoid loopholes. 121
Dept., 90th Stat. Ann. Rep. 46 (1955)." LAFAvE, op. cit. .upr note 111, at 478
n.16.
"'Where statutes provide very severe penalties, courts seems reluctant to im-
pose them. In many communities, bookmaking and other forms of gambling have
come to 'be openly tolerated. Where this attitude prevails, it is difficult to obtain
convictions or deterrent sentences in bookmaking cases." 1 ABA COMM'N ON OR-
GANIZED CRIME, ORGANIZED CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 81 (1952).
119. This was the view one Michigan enforcement official expressed to a field
researcher of the American Bar Foundation Survey of the Administration of
Criminal Justice.
120. "Individuals occupying top positions in organized crime rarely, if ever,
commit any overt acts in violation of existing laws. They are reaping the profits,
however, of organized criminal activity engaged in by others at their direction.
To implicate the higher-ups requires a long, drawn-out investigation and many
months of observation and surveillance. When the only punishment to be ex-
pected as a result is a small fine and a few days in county jail, the investigative
effort is simply not worthwhile." Wilson, supra note 114, at 144.
121. See 2 ABA Comm'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, ORGANIZED CRIME AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT 75 (1953); LAFAvE, op. cit. supra note 111, at 89-90.
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This is true of the Illinois Criminal Code, yet officers in that state have
objected that loopholes are often judicially created. Thus, bookmakers
are sometimes acquitted on the ground that no offense has been com-
mitted because their records do not include a written declaration of the
odds involved in the various bets.122 It is very questionable whether the
1961 statute justifies the conclusion that the odds must be stated,123
though a 1954 appellate court case is often cited by the defense as support
for this proposition.m Such interpretations of the statute resulting in
acquittals are 'not appealable,12r and a recent attempt to remedy the
situation by amending the gambling statute failed.126
b. Inability to Obtain Evidence Within Premises by Acceptable Means
Judicial reluctance to convict certain offenders may also be mani-
fested by the granting of a defense motion to suppress evidence in cases
where the evidence actually was obtained lawfully. Although this un-
doubtedly occurs, it is fair to say that far more cases are lost at this
stage because the law of search is inconsistent with what the police view
as the practical needs of law enforcement, or because of a lack of attention
by appellate courts or legislatures to certain common search questions.
One serious problem the police face is that of obtaining by acceptable
means the critical evidence in cases of certain in-premises violations.
In many instances, the offenders need only a moment's advance notice of
pending police entry in order to dispose of evidence that would be
122. Most bookies, of course, would have no occasion to make a written record
of the odds, for they pay off winners on horse races in accordance with the track
odds. The bookie usually records his bets on ruled pads, referred to by the police
as "20-liners" and "40-liners." A typical entry might read: 'WRL 4 D 8 10-5-0
15.00 00." The first entry is the customer's initials; the next grouping indicates
that the bet is on the fourth race, Detroit track, horse number 8; the next grouping
indicates that the ,bet is $10 win, $5 place, and nothing show; the following entry
merely shows the total amount bet (often labelled as the "In" column); and the
last entry is the amount, if any, won by the bettor (often labelled the "Out" col-
umn).
123. The applicable subsection of the gambling statute refers to one who "uses
or keeps any book, instrument or apparatus for the purpose of recording or regis-
tering bets or wagers ... ." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 28-1(a) (5) (1963).
124. In People v. Lloyd, 3 Ill. App. 2d 257, 257-1, 121 N.E.2d 329, 334 (1954),
the court declared that "odds must be stated in order to make out an offense ...."
125. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, § 120-1 (1963). Few states allow the state to appeal
from an acquittal.
126. The syndicated gambling bill introduced in the Illinois legislature on ,behalf
of the Chicago Police Department, see note 117 supra, included the following state-
ment: "Bookmaking is the receiving or accepting of such bets or wagers regardless
of the form or manner in which the bookmaker records them." H.B. 1458, 73rd
Gen. Ass. (Ill. 1963).
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essential for conviction. The card game for high stakes can be transferred
quickly into a friendly game for sport simply by withdrawing the stakes
from the table. The operator of a "wireroom" need only destroy his bet
records, which he is usually prepared to do either by burning2 7 or by other
means.
128
127. The records usually can be destroyed on very short notice. It is common
for the "wireroom" bookie to keep at band a metal waste basket or similar con-
tainer and a supply of lighter fluid or other flammable liquid. It does not take long,
after the police announce their presence, to burn the records beyond recognition.
Some "wirerooms" are equipped with metal or extra heavy wooden doors with
multiple locks and other special hardware in order to delay forcible entry following
notice until the burning can be completed. In one case in which the police finally
gained entry only to find the bookie standing by a roaring fire in a metal pot, they
made an unsuccessful attempt to have him charged with arson.
"Some bookmakers have recently taken to using a highly flammable paper
of unidentified substance on which to make better notations, the police said.
"As detectives burst into a room on a raid the bookmaker merely touches
the betting slips of flammable paper with a lit cigarette or cigar and the evidence
goes up in a flash of flame. The paper burns almost immediately into powdered
ashes, the police said.
"'Apparently the bookies are reaching into the bag of magicians' tricks these
days,' one detective remarked." New York Times, Nov. 19, 1964, p. 1, col. 8, p. 49,
cols. 1-3.
128. Small quantities of records are sometimes simply flushed down the toilet.
Also, special paper that can be destroyed promptly without use of fire may be used:
"Intelligence unit police raided two bookmaking wire rooms Friday....
"On both raids, detectives were equipped with a chemical neutralizer, but
didn't have to use it.
"They had expected the betting records to have been treated chemically so
they would dissolve when they came in contact with water. This is the latest gim-
mick used by bookmakers to destroy evidence of betting slips." Chicago Sun-Times,
June 6, 1964, p. 1, cols. 2, 8.
"An alleged Brooklyn 'bookmaker attempted to stay out of trouble with
police yesterday by dissolving betting notations written on gelatin paper in a bowl
of cold water.
"But he was unsuccessful and the principal evidence . . . is a block of trans-
parent, congealed gelatin sitting in an icebox ....
"Betting notations, . . . made with a ballpoint pen on the separate sheets of
gelatin paper before they dissolved into a solid 'block, can still be deciphered through
the transparent gelatin, according to the police ....
"The police said that when detectives . . . smashed open the door and burst
into the apartment La Francesca threw a large number of betting slips into a
bowl of water on a table beside the telephone he was allegedly using to take bets.
"[The police] rushed into the kitchen of the apartment, found a wooden
cooking spoon and fished out the sheets of gelatin paper, by then congealed into
a solid block about half an inch thick.
"La Francesca and the evidence were rushed to Police Headquarters, where
the betting notations were photographed and the block was placed in a refrigerator
to ,be presented in court when La Francesca is tried. ...
"The gelatin paper dissolves much more quickly in hot water-in 15 to 20
seconds-the police said, and reported that if La Francesca had kept a pot of
boiling water handy they would not have been able to salvage the evidence against
him.
"The arrested man told the police that he usually kept boiling water ready,
but that he had moved into the Brooklyn apartment only two days before and had
not yet had time to buy a pot and had to rely on the bowl of cold water." New
York Times, Nov. 19, 1964, p. 1, col. 8, 'p. 49, col. 1.
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The prevailing rule on entry of premises to effect an arrest is that
forcible entry (including instances in which all that is necessary to
gain entry is to lift a latch, turn a knob, unhook a chain, remove a prop,
or turn a key) 129 is proper only after the officer has given notice of his
purpose and has demanded admittance. "Upon refusal of such demand,
or if no refusal be made by word or act, upon the expiration of a reason-
able time, the privilege to effectuate a forcible entry arises."'3' Although
such notice is not required when it reasonably appears that the occupants
are already aware of the officer's objective, 131 other exceptions have sel-
dom been recognized."?' The relevant statutes usually reinforce the po-
sition that notice is required,"'3 rather than recognize any exception on
the basis that unannounced entry is sometimes essential to prevent the
destruction of evidence."3 Likewise, there are few appellate cases support-
129. See Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REv. 541, 798 (1924).
130. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 206, comment d (1934).
131. E.g., United States v. Frierson, 299 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1962).
132. The few cases found fall into the following categories:
(1) Those allowing entry without notice and demand where it reasonably
appears that prompt action is required for the protection of a person within, Com-
monwealth v. Tobin, 108 Mass. 426 (1871); People v. Woodward, 220 Mich. 511,
190 N.W. 236 (1922).
(2) Those allowing entry without notice and demand where it reasonably
appears that such entry is required for the protection of the arresting officer, People
v, Hammond, 54 Cal.2d 846, 357 P.2d 289 (1960); People v. Maddox, 46 Cal.2d
301, 294 P.2d 6 (1956); People v. Potter, 144 Cal. App. 2d 350, 300 P.2d 889
(1956). Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822).(3) Those allowing entry without notice and demand where it reasonably
appears that such entry is required to prevent the destruction of evidence, cases
cited note 135 infra.
(4) Those allowing entry without notice and demand where it reasonably
appears that by such entry the actual commission of an offense can be observed,
People v. Ramsey, 157 Cal. App. 2d 178, 320 P.2d 592 (1958).
(5) Those allowing entry without notice and demand where it reasonably
appears that by such entry the escape of the person -to be arrested can be pre-
vented, People v. Maddox, 46 Cal.2d 301, 294 P.2d 6 (1956).
133. Most states have a statute in essentially the following language, which is
from ALI, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28 (Official Draft, 1930): "An officer,
in order to make an arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or when authorized to
make such arrest for a felony without a warrant, as provided in section 21, may
break open a door or window of any building in which the person to be arrested
is or is reasonably believed to be, if he is refused admittance after he has an-
nounced his authority and purpose." For citation of the state statutes, see Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 50 n.4 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
134. Compare the recent New York enactment regarding search warrants,
which allows an officer to enter "without notice of his authority and purpose, if
the judge, justice or magistrate issuing the warrant has directed in writing that
the officer executing it shall not be required to give such notice. The judge, justice
or magistrate may so direct only upon a showing under oath, to his satisfaction,
that the property sought may be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of or
that danger to the life or limb of the officer may result, if such notice were to be
44
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [1965], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol30/iss3/2
IMPROVING POLICE PERFORMANCE
ing any such exception. 135
The situation in Illinois is typical. The newly enacted Code of Crim-
inal Procedure is silent on the question, 1s and appellate cases in point
are not to be found. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that
evidence is frequently suppressed when it is established that the police
made their entry without prior notice. .37 Although this kind of case is a
recurring one, no state's attorney has yet attempted to obtain an ap-
pellate court holding that the need to prevent destruction of evidence
sometimes justifies unannounced entry.1 38 Rather than forego enforcement
against "wirerooms" and similar in-premises activities, the police resort
to enforcement against the conduct without expectation of conviction.
There are other forms of in-premises illegal activity which of neces-
sity involve a certain amount of in-and-out customer traffic. Included
are the illegal sale of liquor, the operation of a handbook (which, unlike
the "wireroom," deals with walk-in bettors), and the operation of a
policy station (usually located in the home or business establishment of
the policy writer). Although precautions are normally taken to insure
against entry by other than regular customers or new prospects who have
been checked upon, plainclothes officers sometimes are able to gain entry
into such establishments by posing as prospective customers. After ob-
given." N.Y. CODE CRnw. Paoc. § 799. See Siegel, New York "Frisk" and "Knock-
Not" Statutes: Are They Constitutional?, 30 BROOKLYN L. REv. 274 (1964); Note,
38 ST. JoHNs L. REv. 392 (1964).
135. People v. Hammond, 54 Cal.2d 846, 357 P.2d 289 (1960); People v. Bar-
nett, 156 Cal. App. 2d 803, 320 P.2d 128 (1958); People v. Ruiz, 146 Cal. App. 2d
630, 304 P.2d 175 (1956); State v. Smith, 37 N.J. 481, 181 A.2d 761 (1962).
136 The statutes merely declare that "all necessary and reasonable force may
be used to effect an entry into any building or property or part thereof to make
an authorized arrest." ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, § 107-5(d) (1963).
137. Illustrative is one observed case in which officers of the gambling unit
received information -from a reliable informant to the effect that he had just placed
a bet via phone with a particular person at a particular number. After determining
through the telephone company the location of the subscriber with that number,
detectives immediately drove to the location. About a block away a "wrong num-
ber" call was made to the bookie to insure he was still on the premises. Upon
'learning he was still there, officers crept quietly up a rear stairway to the second
floor apartment, opened a screen door, entered the apartment, tiptoed up behind
the bookie, and then placed him under arrest and seized the bet records spread
out on the table before him. At trial a defense motion to suppress was granted
because of the purported unlawful entry.
138. It must -be acknowledged that it is presently uncertain how much leeway
the states have to make exceptions to the notice and demand requirements. In
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), the Court upheld an instance of unannounced
entry only after noting that the evidence (narcotics) could, easily be destroyed and
that there were grounds to believe defendant was expecting the police. Four mem-
bers of the Court entered a vigorous dissent, contending that the case of hot pursuit
is the only exception authorized under the constitution.
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serving the illegal activity for a time, they arrest the proprietor and cus-
tomers.
The heart of the prosecution's case in these instances is, of course,
the observation of the plainclothes officer. Testimony as to these observa-
tions is sometimes suppressed, however, on the ground that the officer
was a. trespasser while inside the premises under these circumstances. The
notion, as expressed in one decision commonly cited by the defense
in these instances, is that the officer's action in posing as a customer was
"fraudulent," and thus the permission to enter was ineffective because
given "in ignorance of [the officer's] official character and purpose."139
The police understandably are perplexed by such rulings; while certain
affirmative misrepresentations may be sufficient to vitiate consent 40
it is difficult to fathom the justification for exclusion when the officer has
merely represented himself as a prospective customer of the defendant's
illegal activity. 14' Again, the police frustration often leads to enforcement
without expectation of conviction.
Other rulings by local courts regarding forms of police entry into
premises are likewise viewed with disdain by enforcement officials. Some
of these rulings find no justification in the appellate cases, while some
are based on higher court pronouncements that are arguably a result of
inadequate analysis. Illustrative of the former is the so-called "hotel
rule" of some trial judges: an officer in the upper-floor corridors of a
hotel is a trespasser, and the fruits of his investigation while there are
139. People v. Dent, 371 Ill. 33, 35, 19 N.E.2d 1020, 1022 (1939).
140. Some courts have held the consent to be ineffective because of affirmative
misrepresentations that the officer is other than a member of the general public.
In Fraternal Order of Eagles v. United States, 57 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1932), it was
held improper for officers to gain entry into a lodge hall by misrepresenting that
they were members of a similar club in a distant city and by presenting false mem-
bership cards. Similarly, in United States v. Mitchneck, 2 F. Supp. 225 (M.D.
Pa. 1933), an officer's entry into a private residence by representing himself as a
salesman was held to -be unlawful. Compare United States v. Bush, 283 F.2d 51
(6th Cir. 1960), where the court said it was not improper for the officer to pose as
a member of the public and gain entry into premises as a possible customer for
the sale of illegal liquor, even though the officer suggested to the defendant that
they had mutual acquaintances in order to gain his confidence.
141. Recently the Illinois Supreme Court put to rest the dictum in the Dent
case, supra note 139, which has often served as the basis for suppression in these
cases. An officer, without disclosing his identity, entered a policy station as a
customer, made a policy bet, and observed policy paraphernalia. A search warrant
was issued on the basis of this officer's observations, but at trial the evidence was
excluded on the ground that it was based upon information illegally obtained. The
supreme court held that the officer was not "under any obligation to voluntarily
identify himself as a policeman prior to entering the premises." People v. Walker,
30 Ill.2d 213, 215-16, 195 N.E.2d 654, 656 (1964).
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consequently inadmissible.42 Illustrative of the latter is the holding that
when an officer, after knocking at a door and hearing an invitation to
enter, enters and observes gambling paraphernalia, the evidence is in-
admissible unless the officer can prove that the invitation came from
the tenant rather than from one of the tenant's guests."43 (It seems highly
questionable whether such a case should be governed by artificial con-
cepts of consent or agency rather than by the more basic question of
whether it was reasonable for the officer to enter under such circumstances.)
Suppression of evidence in these and similar instances gives further sub-
stance to the police view that there are no lawful means of obtaining
evidence of certain in-premises criminal conduct.
c. Inability to Establish Acceptable Grounds for On-the-Street Action
To a considerably lesser extent, the police find it difficult to engage
in certain on-the-street enforcement action in a manner acceptable to
the courts. For example, in some locales the police find it almost im-
possible to make an arrest of a "bagman" for possession of gambling
paraphernalia that will withstand challenge on a motion to suppress.
Police records in some communities reflect the curious fact that most
convictions of such offenders result from officers stumbling onto the
evidence in the course of making lawful arrests for other misconduct;
few convictions follow from arrests for the offense of possession made by
officers assigned the task of gambling enforcement.
In those jurisdictions where possession of gambling paraphernalia is
142. For example, in one case two "bagmen" for a policy syndicate were trailed
to a particular hotel, and on subsequent days again were observed to enter the
hotel at the same time, after having made a series of pickups at other places.
Knowing that the "office' of the policy wheel was probably located in the hotel,
but being unaware of the precise room, an officer in janitor's clothes was
stationed in an upper hallway to observe which room the "bagmen" entered. A
search warrant was obtained on the basis of these observations, but at trial the
warrant was quashed on the ground that it was based upon information obtained
while trespassing.
143. In Illinois, at least, suppression on this basis finds support in a supreme
court decision. In that case, two police officers were sent to investigate a woman
suspected of running a policy game in her home. They rang the doorbell and some-
one inside said "come in." They entered and found defendant and another woman
seated at a table full of policy paraphernalia. In a very brief opinion from which
three members of the court dissented, the issue was dealt with simply as one of
consent and agency: "The gist of the act of invitation by another to enter the
premises without a search warrant is that the invitation must be extended under
specific authorization. [Citation omitted.] If anyone may indiscriminately waive
the rights of another, the waiver is not a personal one; hence the constitutional




LaFave: LaFave: Improving Police Performance
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1965
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
only a misdemeanor and arrest without warrant for a misdemeanor is
allowed only under the traditional in-presence standard, the basic prob-
lem is one of what evidence is sufficient to support a lawful in-presence
arrest for such possession. Most in-presence arrests for other misdemeanors
are based upon the fact that the conduct constituting the offense was
observed directly by the arresting officer, and the tendency is to view
this as the sole basis for such arrests. It is not uncommon for arrests
for possession of policy slips to be declared illegal because no slips actually
were observed or because prior to arrest the officer was unable to view the
slips closely enough to conclude beyond a doubt that they were policy
slips.141 If this is a correct application of the in-presence standard, it is
fair to conclude that the "bagman" enjoys almost complete immunity
from arrest without warrant;145 few carriers lack the presence of mind to
conceal their precious cargo from view.146
In fairness to the trial judges who suppress the evidence in the situa-
tions described above, it must be acknowledged that appellate courts
have seldom subjected the in-presence arrest standard to careful analysis.
It is unclear, for example, precisely how the violation must come to the
officer's attention; illustrative is the holding that an admission of possession
is "not the nature or kind of evidence" to justify arrest. 4 The basic
question, upon which the courts are not in agreement, is whether the
in-presence standard requires the officer to be certain of the violation at
144. Police, in a jurisdiction where possession is a misdemeanor and the in-
presence standard applies, watched a women stop at a number of suspected policy
stations. Each time she emerged with a handful of yellow slips. When she saw the
officers observing her, she put the slips under her blouse. She was arrested and
taken to the women's division, where a search disclosed policy slips and $14.59 in
gambling funds. The prosecutor refused to charge, stating: "Those slips of paper
could have been just any yellow slips of paper. I have some yellow slips of paper
on my desk, but just because they are yellow and a certain size does not mean
that they are bet slips." When such cases reach court the explanation for suppres-
sion of the slips is often similarly stated.
145. Arrest with warrant still would be possible if probable cause could be
established, though this raises problems similar to those discussed in the following
text concerning arrest on reasonable grounds to believe. The delay in obtaining
a warrant also would raise the problem of later finding the "bagman" at a time when
he possessed the critical evidence. Most "bagmen" take considerable precautions
to "shake" any police "tail," and they also frequently change their route patterns
to avoid being discovered at the same time and place on subsequent occasions.
146. Some do, however. See People v. West, 15 Ill.2d 171, 154 N.E.2d 286(1958), where the slips were in plain view on an automobile seat. And sometimes
business is so good that the bag or other container used- to carry the slips may be
overflowing. See People v. McGowan, 415 Ill. 375, 114 N.E.2d 407 (1953).
147. Allen v. State, 183 Wis. 323, 335, 197 N.W. 808, 812 (1924). Rather, the
court added, there must be "evidence that comes to the officer through his sense
of sight or other natural senses ......
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the time of arrest,148 or whether a reasonable belief suffices.149 The first
of these positions the police consider completely impractical because it
in effect immunizes from arrest the offender whose misdemeanor conduct
is not of a kind that can be observed directly and unmistakenly by a
bystander.
A reasonable-grounds-to-believe standard is applied to the arrest when
(1) the conduct is viewed as being a felony,1 °0 (2) the conduct is a mis-
demeanor but the law of the jurisdiction allows misdemeanor arrest on
148. This result is supported by those cases holding that an officer is liable in
damages if no misdemeanor was in fact committed, even though he reasonably
believed that the offense was occurring in his presence. See cases collected in Stone,
Arrest Without Warrant, 1939 Wis. L. REv. 385, 387. It might be said that these
cases also support the view that arrest on reasonable belief of a presently occurring
misdemeanor is lawful if it ultimately turns out that the misdemeanor was in fact
being committed. Such a rule is difficult to support as a standard to guide the
conduct of the police, who can be expected to act only upon the basis of what rea-
sonably appears to be true at the time the decision is made.
The confusion in this area is attributable in large measure to the statements
of the early commentators, who simply said without elaboration that there must
actually be a misdemeanor committed. See Warner, Modern Trends in The Ameri-
cao Law of Arrest, 21 CAN. B. REv. 192, 200 n.16 (1943).
149. Illustrative of this view is a case in which a man was arrested for driving
an unregistered auto notwithstanding his assertion before arrest that he had made
application. After noting that application would be sufficient under the substantive
statute involved, the court said:
"If, however, the . . . [officer] had reasonable grounds to disbelieve the state-
ment .... then he might still be justified in the eye of the law in making the
arrest . . . ; for the police officer charged with the duties and responsibilities that
such officers are is not required to justify his action in making an arrest by a sub-
sequent showing that as a matter of fact the offense was committed. It is suf-
ficient if he has reasonable ground for believing that the offense has been com-
mitted by the person whom he then arrests." Bursack v. Davis, 199 Wis. 115,
120-21, 225 N.W. 738, 741 (1929).
More explicit is this statement from Edwards v. State, 190 Wis. 229, 231, 208
N.W. 876 (1926), quoting from Ex parte Morrill, 35 Fed. 261, 267 (9th Cir. 1888):
"A crime is committed in the presence of the officer when the facts and circum-
stances occurring within his observation, in connection with what, under the cir-
cumstances,.may be considered as common knowledge, give him probable cause to
believe, or reasonable ground to suspect, that such is the case."
A different statement of the misdemeanor arrest 'privilege would- insure such
a result. For example, § 6(1) (A) of the Uniform Arrest Act would allow an officer
to arrest without warrant for a misdemeanor whenever "he has reasonable ground
to believe that the person to be arrested had committed a misdemeanor in his
presence." See Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. Rnv. 315 (1942). The
act is set out at pp. 343-47.
150. That there may be a basis for viewing the conduct as a felony is some-
times overlooked. For example, in Michigan possession of policy slips is a misde-
meanor under MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.538 (1949), but the fact of possession is
substantial evidence of a conspiracy, since a policy wheel of necessity involves sev-
eral persons acting in concert. Although the crime of conspiracy is not included
in the Michigan code, it is a common law offense, and while only a misdemeanor
at common law, indictable common law offenses are felonies in that state.
MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.773 (1949). It has been held that this includes conspiracy.
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reasonable grounds to believe, 11 or (3) the conduct is a misdemeanor but
the in-presence test is taken to mean reasonable grounds to believe a
violation is occurring in the presence of the officer. The likelihood of the
evidence being suppressed under these circumstances is not so great, yet
such a result is not uncommon even when it would appear that a lawful
arrest has been made. Such arrests are usually based upon the fact that the
individual (often with a record of past gambling offenses) is traveling in an
area of the city where policy is a popular pastime, is making a series of stops
day after day at locations where policy writing has occurred in the past,
is making these stops during the time of day when policy slips are picked
up, and perhaps is carrying a package with "something" in it. Because
of a failure to consider what these facts would mean to an experienced
officer, 2 such arrests often are declared unlawful."'3 Appellate cases dictating
People v. Smith, 296 Mich. 176, 295 N.W. 605 (1941).
Commented the legal advisor to one large Michigan police department:
'fake for instance an arrest for possession of policy slips. An officer can watch
that man dealing with someone else, and, instead of arresting him for possession,
he can arrest him for conspiracy. Even if he doesn't know the other man, he can
refer to him as John Doe, and then you've got a valid arrest .... And if he finds
in this man's possession gambling paraphernalia and he charges him with posses-
sion, academically that's a good search. But whether it will be in court is another
question?'
151. For example, in Illinois the police can arrest without warrant for any
offense on reasonable grounds to believe. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 107-2 (1963).
152. Compare, however, the following observation -by a federal judge in denying
a motion to suppress in a fact situation much like that described in the text above:
"It is common knowledge that the numbers business in the area has developed
and sharpened into a high degree of stealthy and surreptitious activities aimed at
side tracking'and deceiving law enforcement officers. It is also known that law
enforcement officers engaged in tracking this lottery trafficing have acquired a
high degree of knowledge of the trafficers, their identities and their methods in
such trafficing." United States v. Schwartz, 234 F. Supp. 804, 807 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
153. It should also be mentioned, however, that sometimes all of these facts
are not put before the court. This is in one sense a contributing cause of the
problem and in another sense a consequence of it. That is, if an officer is not ade-
quately trained to present his grounds in court, this will lead to suppression in
cases where there were in fact ground -for arrest and where, as a practical mat-
ter, no greater amount of evidence could possibly be obtained. But, in other
instances the failure of the officer to present all of the facts may be attributable
to a conclusion from prior experience that to do so would be futile. Knowing
the evidence will be suppressed in any event, the testifying officer merely tries
to get the proceedings over with as quickly as possible.
Cases in which the officer's testimony on the motion to suppress is not as
complete as it might be also raise a difficult question as to the approach to be
taken by a reviewing court. A possession-of-policy-paraphernalia case that re-
cently reached the United States Supreme Court points up the difficulty. Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). Although Justice Harlan in his dissent was of the
view that from the record there was "no lack of common understanding at trial
that the informant had given the officer the crucial information" that the
offender would be involved in the activity at a particular time and place, id. at 102,
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a contrary result are not to be found; prior instances of such suppression
are either unappealable or, where appealable, unappealed.1 " Since it is
the rare case in which any greater amount of evidence against the "bagman"
can be uncovered prior to arrest, the choices open to the police are again
either to cease enforcement in this area or to continue to make these arrests
without expectation of conviction.
Although the connection is not so close, it is fair to say that the
aggressive patrol technique in high-crime areas also results in part from
police inability to obtain judicial approval of certain other on-the-street
action. At least some of those who are simply stopped and searched are
engaged in suspicious conduct short of that sufficient to support an arrest.
In a few jurisdictions, either by case lawls5 or statute,1 58 the police are
authorized under such circumstances to conduct a "field interrogation," 5 17
consisting of brief on-the-street detention and interrogation.'-, In most
states, however, this practice has not received careful analysis, with the
result that the common approach is to say that an arrest on inadequate
ground's occurred at the time of the initial stopping. Lacking clear authority
to take this preliminary step, the police tend to proceed directly to a
complete arrest and search.
3. Reasons for the Practice: Pressures for Unrelenting Police Action
Of course, the fact that the police view conviction or meaningful con-
the majority refused to draw such an inference from a record which did not in-
clude a specific statement 'by the officer of what his informant had told him.
154. This is attributable to a lack of effective communication between police
and prosecution agencies. Although it would be most desirable, from the police
viewpoint, to obtain appellate review regarding this frequently recurring situation,
the prosecutor is unlikely to recognize the need and instead will expend the
resources of his office seeking review of felony cases.
155. The cases are cited in Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street"
Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privi-
leges in General, 51 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 386, 391 nn.30, 31 (1960).
156. Section 2 of the Uniform Arrest Act provides for field interrogation
under some circumstances. This provision has been adopted in three states. DEL.
CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 1902 (1958); N. H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 594:2 (1960); R. L
GEN. LAws, tit. 12, ch. 7 (1956). Recently, a "stop-and-frisk" provision was en-
acted in New York. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 180a. See Siegel, New York "Frisk"
and "Knock-Not" Statutes; Are They Constitutional?, 30 BROOKLYN L. REv. 274
(1964); Note, 38 ST. JOHNs L. REv. 392 (1964).
157. This is the phrase commonly used by the police to describe the stopping
and questioning situation. See BiasTow, FIELD INTERROGATION (1958); LAFAvE,
op. cit. supra note 111, at 344-47.
158. It may also include a "frisk" of the suspect by the officer for purposes of
self protection, which makes it more difficult to determine whether the practice
is inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Some states, by case law or statute, have provided that under some
circumstances the officer may frisk as well; others have not. See sources cited in
notes 155 and 156 supra.
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viction as unattainable in some cases does not in itself explain why the
common practice of arresting for purposes other than prosecution or con-
viction exists. Instead of continuing with an enforcement program of fixed
dimensions and merely altering the objective in some cases, it might be
thought that police administrators would react to the dilemma described
earlier by redefining the focus of their enforcement activity. If, for example,
it is nearly impossible to obtain essential evidence against "wireroom"
operators in a fashion that will be accepted by local courts, then why
not abandon enforcement in this area 59 in favor of increased efforts against
some other conduct? This view has not prevailed in police thinking, and
consequently it is not enforcement but the expectation of conviction that
is abandoned. One reason for this, to be discussed shortly, is that the police
have concluded that certain desirable investigative and punitive objectives
can be realized by continued police action even if meaningful convictions
are unattainable. A second reason is that public, institutional, and other
real or imagined pressures militate against substantial withdrawal from the
enforcement activity in question.
Public attitudes, or, more accurately, what the police perceive pub-
lic attitudes to be,160 can have a significant impact upon law enforce-
ment.' 10 Police agencies generally have not been shielded effectively from
159. It has been suggested that such abandonment also ultimately might
inure to police benefit by dramatizing the impracticality of current restrictions
-upon the police:
"I would like to see the police of some city or state run a little experiment-
announce publicly that from henceforth on the police department is going to fol-
low the rules just as the courts have laid them down. In other words, the police
are not going to cheat one bit. Furthermore, let it be known that the police are
not going to be responsible for the consequences. Then try it for about three
weeks. I predict that you will have such disorder, such chaos, such a dangerous
situation, that there will be a clamor for a return to normality and for giving
the police meaningful weapons with which to fight the suspected perpetrators of
crimes." Statement of Professor Inbau in A Forum on thre Interrogation of the
Accused, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 382, 401 (1964).
160. There is, of course, no assurance that police perceptions of what the
public wants accurately reflect the true desires of the community. Professor
John P. Clark, Department of Sociology, University of Illinois, has conducted
an interesting empirical study of the extent and nature of police isolation in
three medium-sized Illinois communities. He found a fairly high correlation be-
tween police perceptions of community expectations and actual public expecta-
tions, although there are some striking differences-particularly as to expecta-
tions on when a warning should be employed in lieu of arrest. See Clark, The
Isolation of the Police: A Comparison of tire Britishr and American Situations, to
appear in a forthcoming issue of J. CRuvs. L., C. & P.S.
161. The effect upon law enforcement of public attitudes has long been
recognized as an important problem. See, e.g., SMITH, POLICE SYSTEMS IN TE
UNrrED STATES 5-7, 18-19, 285-86, 366-67 (1940); ARNOLD, THE SYMBoLS OF
GOVERNMENT ch. 7 (1935).
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public pressure; indeed, law enforcement agencies often are structured
to insure a large measure of popular control. These agencies are de-
centralized and fragmented,162 and the selection of police administrators
and police officers usually occurs in a fashion calculated to insure that
they will be responsive to local opinion163 Also, the very nature of po-
licing is such that it is essential to maintain public support; "in a dem-
ocratic society . . . [the police depend] upon the public with regard to
detection, evidence, financial support, and in the last analysis, the
police job itself."'" The police literature abounds with exhortations re-
garding the need to maintain good public relations and continued popular
support. 65
Under these circumstances, it is not too surprising that enforce-
ment practices are sometimes tailored to fit what the police believe to
be public expectations. Police administrators assert that "there is a wide
discrepancy between what the people expect the police to do and what
the police are permitted to do under the law,"' 66 and then frankly admit
162. Smith notes that these are "the most striking characteristics of American
police patterns, since no other -part of the world has carried local autonomy in
police management to such extreme lengths." SMITH, op. cit. supra note 161, at
342 (1940). Generally any change toward more consolidated police power is
opposed. E.g., Hoover, The Basis of Sound Law Enforcement, 291 Annals 39, 40
(1954).
"The police, under local control as in our form of government, are inclined
to provide the protection their citizen-employers demand . . . ." Wilson, Police
Arrest Privileges in a Free Society: A Plea for Modernization, 51 J. CRIM. L., C.
& P.S. 395, 398 (1960).
163. Popular election of the sheriff is the general rule in this country, SMrrH,
op. cit. supra note 161, at 84-85 (1940), and selection of an appointed police ad-
ministrator is apt to involve careful consideration of how responsive the various
candidates likely-would be to local opinion. Sherwood, Roles of City Manager and
Police, Public Management 110 (May 1959). Possible candidates for the job
may be limited to local residents, as is usually the case with regard to member-
ship in the department. SmrrH, op. cit. supra note 161, at 162, 246. Such a "police
leader, appointed by representatives of the people, has to consider the hazard of
unresponsiveness." Germann, Hurdles to Professional Police Competence: IX.
Confusions About Police and Civil Liberties, 8 Police 28 (Jan-Feb. 1964).
164. Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L. J. 133, 143
(1953).
165. E.g., WILSON, POLICE ADmINISTRATION chs. 10, 11 (2d ed. 1963); INTER-
NATIONAL CITY MANAGERS' ASSOCIATION, MUNICIPAL POLICE ADMINISTRATION chs.
14, 15 (5th ed. 1961); CLIFT, A GUIDE TO MODERN POLICE THINKING ch. 29
(1956); Ashenhust, Police Public Relations, 2 Police 7 (MarchApril 1958); Brere-
ton, Law Enforcement-A Profession, 1 Police 12 (May-June 1957).
166. Wilson, Police Authority in a Free Society, 54 J. CRnvi. L., C. & P.S. 175,
176 (1963). "The police action demanded by the citizen from his protector is
illegal in many jurisdictions," the Chicago Superintendent has commented on
another occasion. Wilson, Police Arrest Privileges in a Free Society: A Plea for
Modernization, 51 J. CRnvi. L., C. & P.S. 395, 398 (1960). Commissioner Murphy
of New York has lamented, "We cannot achieve, in our various communities, a
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that under these circumstances they choose to respond to the public
demand. Thus, Superintendent Wilson of Chicago has declared, "If we
followed some of our court decisions literally, the public would be de-
manding my removal as Superintendent of Police and-I might add-with
justification. '' t67 Chief Parker of Los Angeles has taken the view that
"it is anticipated that the police will ignore these legal limitations when
the immediate public welfare appears to demand police lawlessness. "1168
And Chief Schrotel of Cincinnati has stated: the dilemma of the po-
liceman in these terms: "either he abides by the prescribed rules and
renders ineffective service, or he violates or circumvents the rules and
performs the service required of him." 16 9
The fact that ignoring or violating the rules will result in the sup-
pression of critical evidence and acquittal of the offender apparently is
of little significance here. The police motivation is "to relieve the depart-
ment of public pressures and unwelcome attention," 17° and this is ac-
complished if arrests are made; a lack of convictions is less often viewed
by the public as a reflection on the police as it is a reflection upon the
prosecutor or court. Thus, in terms of maintaining popular support, the
aggressive street patrol is a most significant part of the total enforcement
program. Stolen property is recovered, dangerous weapons are removed
from circulation, and occasionally a person wanted for a serious and
much-publicized offense is arrested. The satisfaction of the general public
that the police are "on the job" is, of course, thought to be a more im-
portant desideratum than the good will of the minority and low-income
groups found in the high-crime areas where the aggressive patrol is utilized.
climate of law and order when there is a gap between the police and the public
they serve." A Forum on the Interrogation of the Accused, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 382,
383 (1964).
167. Wilson, Police Authority ins a Free Society, 54 J. CmIv. L., C. & P.S. 175,
177 (1963).
168. Parker, Thse Police Service-A Key to Community Quality, 55 J. CRIM.
L., C. & P.S. 273, 276 (1964).
169. Quoted in Germann, Hurdles to Professional Police Competence: VII.
Confusions About Police and Civil Liberties, 8 Police 55, 56 (Nov.-Dec. 1963).
170. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961
Sup. Cr. REV. 1, 39.
"Some police executives and officers become frustrated because of pressures.
With rising crime rates and pressures for action, particularly with respect to the
anti-social offenses in extreme public disfavor, some police accept and implement
policies that are technically illegal, in order 'to get the job done,' and in order to
'take the heat off.' When this happens, the end becomes a justification of the
means, and the urges of expedient action replace any rational attention to civil
rights." Germann, Hurdles to Professional Police Competence: IX. Confusions
About Police and Civil Liberties, 8 Police 28 (Jan.-Feb. 1964).
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The situation as to gambling and liquor violations is somewhat more
complex because of the ambivalence of public attitudes toward such
crimes.
On the one hand, there is considerable public tolerance of and
participation in much of this criminal behavior and little dispo-
sition to cooperate with official efforts to eliminate it. On the
other hand, evidence of police failure to eliminate gambling . . .
brings down upon the department the wrath of a hostile press
and other organs of public opinion.171
The pressure for tolerance appears to be fairly well distributed among
the various criminal justice agencies; for example, it in part explains
the judicial reluctance to convict or impose meaningful sentences. The
pressure for vigorous enforcement, however, focuses directly upon the
police because it is the police agency that normally determines the outer
boundaries of enforcement. In the face of such pressures, there is con-
siderable reluctance to retreat from aggressive enforcement against pro-
fessional gambling. Rather, the arrest-without-conviction process in one
sense allows the police to respond to these conflicting pressures simulta-
neously.
There is no substantial corresponding public pressure upon the police
to conform their activities with what the law on arrest, search and
seizure allows. In the first place, it would appear that the public is largely
ignorant of the nature of the constitutionally required restrictions.' 2
Secondly, "illegal searches are typically less offensive to the dignity of
the citizenry and less often characterized by violence and brutality than
are illegal interrogatory practices, . . . [and therefore they are] less likely
to attract the interest of the press . . . [or] to arouse community opinion
. . .,,473 As one commentator puts it:
No other constitutional guarantee is so openly flouted with so
little public outcry. The people, usually jealous of their constitu-
171. Allen, supra note 170, at 38-39.
172. "There exists a sizable ignorance about police, and we find many people
who are unfamiliar with the role of law enforcement in a democratic society,
and many who do not understand the goals of law enforcement.
"Often, people who blindly support . . . police are unaware of the nuances
of legality, morality, and efficiency involved in any police undertaking and in
any action by a police officer." Germann, Hurdles to a Professional Police Com-
petence: VII. Confusions About Police and Civil Liberties, 8 Police 33, 35 (Sept.-
Oct. 1963).
173. Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in
State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1083, 1098 (1959).
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tional freedoms, do not react to this violation of a fundamental
guarantee as they do to violations of the right to freedom of speech,
press, religion, and assembly. It does not shock the public con-
science like brutal coercion of confessions or punishment without
the safeguards of a trial.174
Finally, there appears to be little public concern with how the police
treat people as long as they restrict their activities to those the public
thinks are criminals.175 Thus, the illegal search that uncovers evidence
establishing the suspect's guilt does not come in for public disapprobation.
One factor that undoubtedly increases the impact of presumed public
pressures upon the police is the prevailing defensive attitude of the police
themselves. There is great hesitation upon the part of police administrators
to acknowledge that the police are unable to cope with the crime problem,
whatever the reason. They fear that the public would misinterpret the
situation and that consequently respect for and confidence in the police
would deteriorate.76
Most law enforcement officials long ago resigned ,themselves to
the role of the underdog upon whom the unsolved problems of
174. Comment, 47 Nw. U. L. REv. 493 (1952).
175. This conclusion is strongly supported by the findings of a most interesting
empirical study. Westley, The Police: A Sociological Study of Law, Custom and
Morality 118 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Dep't. of Sociology, Univ. of Chicago,
1951).
"If the majority of people in a community, in and, out of the police service,
take the position that the criminal syndicate member . . . [and other offenders)
should be 'treated as an enemy of society,' and that 'any and all means should
be used to neutralize his insidious attack upon the community,' it is quite possi-
ble, and highly probable, that police practices will reflect those kinds of mental
commitments....
"And a portion of American police practices seems to be generally tolerated,
if not totally blessed: harassment of anti-social elements; illegal entries for the
purpose of obtaining information . . . ." Germann, Hurdles to Professional Police
Competence: IX. Confusions About Police and Civil Liberties, 8 Police 28 (Jan.-
Feb. 1964).
176. In a recent Harris Survey it was concluded that currently, "while a ma-jority of the public now expresses confidence in law enforcement agencies, sizable
minorities feel they are doing an inadequate job." A cross-section of the public
was asked: "Would you rate the job being done by law enforcement officials (on
the local level, state level, federal level) positively or negatively?"
The public ratings were as follows:
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society were piled high.... [Tjhe average police official ...has
learned two characteristics of his job: he must bear this burden
well and he must refrain from discussing it lest it be a source
of embarrassment to him and the community.' 77
As a former New York Deputy Commissioner puts it, the police-perceived
public distaste for authority
tends to discourage policemen from disclosing their weaknesses
and needs. Instead they are given to the defensive report which
boasts that, while the situation is difficult and challenging, "your
dedicated police department is on top of the job."'17
Thus, it is not thought feasible to withdraw from a particular enforcement
activity with the explanation that such action is necessitated by the
legal restrictions on the police or the attitudes of the local judiciary.
There are also other pressures, some of an institutional nature, which
make it difficult to delimit enforcement activity to that which will allow
subsequent convictions. An officer in charge of a specialized unit, such as
a vice squad or aggressive patrol force, can be expected to resist any
redefinition of enforcement policy that would diminish the size of his unit
or the scope of its operation. Likewise, he will not look favorably upon any
possible change that would adversely affect his particular division's paper
record of achievement. Inasmuch as it is common police practice to
measure efficiency in terms of the number of arrests or "clearances" made,
any drop-off in arrests (even of the unconvictable) would likely be viewed
within the department as a sign of retrogression. Somehow a record of
100 arrests and 80 clearances but only 10 convictions outshines one of 30
arrests, 25 clearances, and 20 convictions. This near obsession with the
apprehension of the offender as an end in itself also filters down to the
lowest ranks, where "the natural ardor of the chase" 79 also takes hold.
4. Reasons for the Practice: Ability to Realize Certain Objectives
Without Conviction





Chicago Daily News, Dec. 8, 1964, p. 5, col. 1-4.
177. Goldstein, Police Discretion: The Ideal Versus the Real, 23 PUB. ADMIN.
REv. 140, 143-44 (1963).
178. Dougherty, The Case for the Cop, Harper's, April 1964, pp. 129, 132.
179. This apt phrase is from the pen of Lord Justice Devlin, who also has
some other interesting observations on why police act the way they do. DEVLIN,
THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 55 (1958).
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making arrests and searches when conviction or meaningful conviction will
not follow are swept away upon consideration of what can be accomplished
even without conviction. As the chances of conviction diminish these other
consequences take on added importance, and finally they become the primary
objectives within certain avenues of enforcement. Police come to view
arrest without conviction as a means of imposing some sanctions upon
offenders, getting weapons out of circulation, recovering stolen property,
and "keeping the lid on" in high-crime areas of the community.
A number of sanctions can be imposed upon the violator of the gambling
or liquor laws even when conviction is unattainable or is not attempted.
A period of detention, ranging from a matter of hours to a couple of days,
is possible. Some offenders are released by the police after a few hours,
others may obtain their release then or later by posting bond or by habeas
corpus, while still others may be held until their case reaches court and is
then dismissed. The police view this brief period of custody not only as
a means of punishment but also as a means of interrupting, at least for
a time, the illegal activity.
Except in those cases (usually involving frequenters of illegal gambling
or liquor establishments) where the police release the offender after a few
hours, the costs of obtaining release and terminating the action are an
added sanction. In some locales it is customary for professional gambling
and liquor offenders, particularly those with syndicate connections, to
obtain release by writ of habeas corpus.8 0 This requires the services of
an attorney.18' Added to that cost is the charge of the professional bonds-
men, 82 because counsel at habeas corpus hearings ordinarily do not challenge
the basis of the original arrest in order to obtain the outright release of
their clients.18 3 Rather, habeas corpus is viewed merely as a means of
180. See note 106 supra.
181. In the one metropolitan area studied in which use of the writ for this
purpose is very common, the attorneys' fees for obtaining release on such a writ
usually are $75.
182. In all of the jurisdictions observed, the bondsman would charge 10%
of the bond as his fee. The amount of bond set in these cases varies considerably,
but the lowest bond observed was $300, set on a policy "bagman.'
183. Just why this is so is not entirely clear. Some defense attorneys, when
asked why they did not challenge the arrest and detention in order to obtain
outright release of their clients, said they thought this would be inappropriate and
that the judges would not listen to such an argument. It may be that their
clients do not think it desirable to challenge the arrest and release practice directly;
they may prefer present practice to what they think the police might do in the
event of a successful challenge. There may be some truth to the claim thatjudges would not listen to arguments for outright release. Judges know of, tolerate,
and in a sense support the arrest-for-purposes-other-than-convicton practice.
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bringing about a prompt release or bond.'1' In other communities this
use of the writ has not developed, but bondsmen's and attorneys' fees
nonetheless become a charge on these offenders' illegal operations. At the
first regular appearance of the offender in court, bond will be set unless
the system is such that it is possible to go to trial immediately. Everyone
expects that the trial will be terminated upon the granting of a motion
to suppress the evidence obtained by the police, but the services of counsel
are thought necessary to insure this result.
The offender may incur other costs because of the interruption of his
illegal activity and the seizure of his records. For example, if a "wireroom,"
policy "office," or similar activity is uncovered in a particular apartment
or house, the offender usually will find it necessary to relocate his operation.
The cost of obtaining other quarters for use during a period when rent
has already been paid on the premises previously used increases the
operating expense of the illegal business. Moreover, in order to maintain
good "customer relations," those who take bets in various forms of gambling
operations often feel compelled to pay off all bettors who claim to have
had winning bets, a matter which cannot be disproven because of police
184. There appears to be considerable confusion about precisely what is to be
decided when habeas corpus is brought concerning a person recently arrested and
not yet brought into court, and also about when, if ever, it is proper to set bail.
It would appear that outright release is proper only if there are presently no
grounds to support an arrest or if, notwithstanding the existence of such grounds,
there is not sufficient evidence to charge and the time for.in-custody investiga-
tion has expired . Continuation of custody would appear proper if grounds support-
ing the arrest are present, the time for in-custody investigation has not expired,
and the custody of the suspect is essential to the investigation. Release on bail
would seem proper if the person were charged, and, perhaps, when it is necessary
to adjourn the habeas corpus hearing -for a time. It also would seem proper when
the time for post-arrest investigation has not expired but it is clear that con-
tinued custody of the suspect is not essential to the investigation. See LAFAvE
ARREST: THE DEcisION TO TO TAKE A SUSPECT ITro CUSTODY 332-37 (1965).
Appellate cases on these problems are rare. In one fairly recent case the Michi-
gan court quoted with approval language of the United States Supreme Court in
Barth v. Clise, 79 U.S. 400, 402 (1870), that the judge has custody over the prisoner
from the time of his production until the case finally is disposed of and that "pend-
ing the hearing he may be bailed de die in diem, or be remanded to the jail whence
he came, or be committed to any other suitable place of confinement under the
control of the court." People v. McCager, 367 Mich. 116, 123, 116 N.W.2d 205,
208 (1962). Shortly after the decision in this case, the court issued an order to
lower courts in the state directing that only brief continuances be granted, and
the court then added: "Because determination of legal cause of detention in
habeas corpus proceedings must be made expeditiously, with no more than such
brief delay as above indicated, the question of release of a prisoner on bail pending
hearing should not arise until after determination that legal cause exists for de-
tention. Thereafter, if the offense for which the prisoner is detained is bailable,
release may be ordered on bail notwithstanding the existence of legal cause for
detention." 42 MicH. ST. BAut J. 56 (April 1963).
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seizure of the bet records. In policy and numbers, where winners are paid
at extremely high odds, such payoffs are not made. 85 A bookie, however,
with an established clientele of regular bettors, ordinarily will pay off all
claimed winners. Knowing this, the police often will time a raid on a
"wireroom" so that the arrest of the bookie occurs after all bets for that
day have been received.
Of major significance in these cases is the fact that the police seize all
property used in the illegal operation. If the activity involves use of a
telephone, it is removed at the time of the raid. Frequently there is a
working arrangement between telephone company officials and law enforce-
ment personnel to prevent reinstallation of a telephone for this offender.'s6
Any illegal liquor or gambling paraphernalia found will either be destroyed
on the spot or else seized. Since these items are contraband,1s7 the person
from whom they were seized is not entitled to their return even if the search
was unlawful."88
Money which is thought to be connected with the illegal enterprise
also is seized. Funds which are "in play" when police interrupt a
gambling game obviously are connected with the crime, but it is less
certain that this nexus is present when money on the person of an arrested
bookie or bagman is seized. It is common practice for the police to question
these individuals in an attempt to distinguish between private funds and
gambling funds, and the case report in these instances will indicate whether
the confiscated funds were "admitted to be used in gambling." In one
185. Usually players are forewarned of this possibility. For example, in Chi-
cago the B & 0 and related policy wheels distribute a small eight-page booklet
listing pay-off rates. On the last page the player is cautioned, "We Pay No Shut-
Out Books," and then is advised to "Please notify management of any complaints."
186. For example, in one large metropolitan area the practice is for the police,
after a telephone removal, to inform the prosecutor's office and the telephone
company of this fact. Under a standing agreement with the company, the tele-
phone will not be reinstalled until such time as a clearance is obtained from the
prosecuting attorney's office. The prosecutor has delegated this clearance function
to the vice bureau of the police department. In this department, over 200 tele-
phones were seized in a one-year period.
187. Contraband usually is defined as any article "which it is unlawful for a
person to have in his possession . ..." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150(1925). Included are such items as lottery tickets, United States v. Seltzer, 5 F.2d
364 (D. Mass. 1925); slot machines, State v. Hoffman, 245 Wis. 398, 14 N.W.2d
148 (1944); cards, chips, and dice, State v. Gambling Equipment, 45 Ariz. 112,
40 P.2d 746 (1935); and illegal liquor, State v. McGee, 55 S.C. 247, 33 S.E. 353(1898).
188. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Trupiano v. United States,
334 U.S. 699 (1947).
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large urban center, approximately 34,000 dollars was confiscated from
gamblers over a one-year period.""'
In cases where the gambler is not prosecuted or, if prosecuted, is not
convicted, the funds seldom are returned. In some police departments a
high administrative officer is given the responsibility of determining whether
or not to return money obtained in a gambling raid. The criteria which
usually govern his decision are (a) whether the person has an extensive
criminal record, and (b) whether he was clearly guilty of the offense for
which conviction is unattainable. If this officer refuses to return the money,
the individual will sometimes bring suit to force return, but, as one police
official observed, this is done only when the individual feels that the
amount is worth fighting for. Sometimes the court will order return of
the money, either because there is no convincing evidence that the money
was used in gambling or else because it is thought the illegal search requires
return. It has been held, however, that neither acquittal of the gambling
charge nor suppression of the money because it was obtained by an
illegal search necessarily compels return of the money. °0 Moreover, since
the quantum of proof in the civil action is only a preponderance of evidence,
recovery has been denied in a number of cases in which the connection
189. In this same municipality, $8,810.31 was seized in one precinct in a six-
month 'period. It is interesting to note that the money was taken from 582 in-
dividuals, only 24 of whom were ever prosecuted.
190. For example, in Dufauchard v. Ward, 51 Ill. App. 2d 42, 200 N.E.2d
833 (1964), it was held that plaintiff, though acquitted in the criminal action, was
not necessarily entitled to return of money alleged to be an integral part of his
gambling operation, because the instant acton, 'being a civil suit, required proof
only by a preponderance of evidence. In Martucci v. Detroit Comm'r of Police,
322 Mich. 270, 33 N.W.2d 789 (1948), plaintiff was suing for return of money
seized by the police as gambling funds, but also was able to raise in his behalf
the fact that in the criminal case the money was suppressed as having been ob-
tained by an unreasonable search. In one part of the opinion the court seems to
say simply that the exclusionary rule is not relevant in a recovery action ("Like-
wise, in the instant case we hold that the money, admittedly the proceeds of
gambling, cannot be recovered by mandamus. The dismissal of the criminal pro-
ceedings for technical reasons does not in any way alter such result." Id. at 273,
33 N.W.2d at 791.). Elsewhere the court suggests that it does apply but that a
new determination of the legality of the search, applying the civil standard of
proof, is appropriate. ("On the question of whether or not the court in the civil
action is bound by the determination of the examining magistrate in the criminal
case, we hold that it is not. For one thing, the rules of evidence governing the two
cases are unlike. . . .Notwithstanding the examining magistrate concluded that
there had been an unlawful search and seizure, there is sufficient evidence in this
record to sustain a finding of a lawful search and seizure." Id. at 274, 33 N.W.2d
at 791.)
A somewhat similar issue has arisen in the federal courts in cases where
gambling funds uncovered by an unlawful search are made the object of a for-
feiture proceeding under the internal revenue laws. The courts are not in agree-
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between the money and the gambling operation was not clearly established.1 91
The public nuisance law of some jurisdictions permits other items not
per se illegal but used in connection with the illegal activity to be con-
fiscated. The statutory provisions of Michigan are illustrative. There "any
building, vehicle, boat, aircraft or place" used for purposes of lewdness,
prostitution, gambling, or the illegal storage or sale of narcotics or intoxi-
cating liquor is declared a nuisance.1 92 Such nuisance may be perpetually
enjoined,19 with the risk of substantial penalties for contempt should the
injunction be violated,04 or the vehicle, boat, or aircraft or contents of
the building may be seized and sold, with the proceeds going to the state. 95
The most common use of these provisions is against automobiles operated
by "bagmen" in making their pick-ups and deliveries."9 When the police
ment on the question of whether the exclusionary rule applies in such instances.
Compare United States v. $1,058.00 in United States Currency, 323 F.2d 211 (3rd
Cir. 1963) (holding exclusionary rule not applicable), wit&. United States v.
$5,608.30 in United States Coin and Currency, 326 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1964);
United States v. $4,171.00 in United States Currency, 200 F. Supp. 28 (N.D. Ill.
1961) (both holding the exclusionary rule applicable). It is interesting to note
that Supreme Court cases can be found supporting both positions. In the first
of the above three cases, the court said it was compelled to the result by United
States v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U.S. 321 (1926), while the last case cited above
relied upon Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
191. For example, see Dufauchard v. Ward, note 190 supra, where the court
refused to return $844 found in the pocket of a walking bookmaker. The court ob-
served:
"Plaintiff seeks to distinguish the facts of this case from those in other contra-
band cases, claiming a difference in character of the depository where the money
was kept in plaintiff's drawers rather than in counter drawers, as in People v.
Wrest, 345 Ill. App. 186, 103 N.E.2d 171 (1951) or in slot machines, as in Ger-
mania Club v. City of Chicago, 332 Ill. App. 112, 74 N.E.2d 29 (1947). We be-
lieve that variations in the type of receptacle, limited only by the ingenuity of
persons notorious for their resourcefulness, do not require the application of any
different legal principle, provided only that the money, as in the case at bar, is
shown to have been the stake or otherwise an integral part of the gambling opera-
tion. Cases from other jurisdictions illustrate the wide variety of storage places
from which cash has been seized and held subject to confiscation: State v. Fossett,
11 Terry 460, 50 Del. 560, 134 A.2d 272 (1957) (desk of bookmaker); Common-
wealth v. Blythe, 178 Pa. Super. 575, 115 A.2d 906 (1955) (apron of bingo-game
operator); Fairmount Engine Co. v. Montgomery County, 135 Pa. Super. 367, 5
A.2d 419 (1939) (safe in basement of engine house in which lottery was operated);
Rader v. Simmons, 290 N.Y. 449, 49 N.E.2d 523, 525 (1943) (pockets of policy
"banker"); and Kenny v. Wachenfield, 184 A. 737, 14 N.J. Misc. 322 (1936)
(pocket of bookmaker)." 51111. App. 2d at 42, 200 N.E.2d at 835-36.
192. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.3801 (1962).
193. Mica. STAT. ANN. § 27A.3805 (1962).
194. Micir. STAT. ANN. § 27A.3820 (1962). The person offending may be fined
not more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned in the county jail not more than 6 months,
or both.
195. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.3825 (1962).
196. The provision allowing confiscation of automobiles has been held to be
constitutional, People ex rel. Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v. Sill, 310 Mich. 570,
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confiscate a car in such a case, the usual practice is to begin a nuisance
action without regard to whether the search that uncovered the violation
was lawful. Sometimes such action is not undertaken and the car is returned;
this is done when the search was not legal and the offense is a minor one
committed by a person who does not have a prior record. In other instances,
however, it is common for the case to reach the point at which a "consent
.decree"'19 is entered, allowing the owner of the automobile to recover his
car upon the payment of court costs. The costs are set at an amount
calculated to induce the owner to enter into the consent decree rather
than challenge in court the validity of the nuisance proceedings.19s The
prosecutor is amenable to the consent decree procedure in most cases
because he knows that the nuisance action might successfully be chal-
lenged because of the unlawful search.3 99 The owner of the car also
ordinarily prefers this alternative, because the cost is less than the
attorney's fees would otherwise be and he does not have to wait the two
or three months which would elapse before the nuisance action could be
decided in his favor. Actual trial of the nuisance action to determine
17 N.W.2d 756 (1945), and it has been held that a single instance of an automobile
being used to transport mutuel tickets was sufficient for the automobile to be
declared a nuisance and sold. People ex rel. Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v.
Bitonti, 306 Mich. 115, 10 N.W.2d 329 (1943).
197. The typical decree states that the owner of the car is permanently en-joined from using the automobile for illegal activity, that the car will be returned
upon payment of costs, and that the owner frees the officers from any liability for
damages by acknowledging that the seizure of the car was lawful.
198. In one city the local judges have established a scale of court costs based
upon the age of the automobile. For example, costs for return of a new car are
$119, while costs for a car manufactured four or more years earlier are $69. Be-
cause this is so, "bagmen" usually use old cars in their business; sometimes the
car is not even worth the court costs, in which case the owner will not appear, and
a default decree will be entered. In one four-month period in this city, 163 con-
sent decrees and 20 default decrees were entered.
199. The local judges are apparently of the view that the exclusionary rule is
applicable in such a nuisance action. There are no appellate cases under the Michi-
gan statute that so -hold, however. Compare the view taken by the Michigan Su-
preme Court toward a somewhat analogous situation in the Martici case, discussed
in note 190 supra.
There is no agreement in the cases elsewhere on whether the exclusionary rule
is applicable in a proceeding to forfeit an automobile used in criminal activity.
Compare Commonwealth v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 414 Pa. 540, 201 A.2d 427
(1964); United States v. One 1956 Ford Tudor Sedan, 253 F.2d 725 (4th Cir.
1958) (both holding auto can be forfeited notwithstanding illegal seizure), with
United States v. One 1963 Cadillac Hardtop, 220 F. Supp. 841 (E.D. Wis. 1963);
United States v. One 1960 Lincoln Two-Door Hardtop, 195 F. Supp. 205 (D.
Mass. 1961) (both holding that illegally seized evidence is inadmissible).
Subsequent to the completion of this article the United States Supreme Court
has held that the exclusionary rule must be applied in forfeiture cases. One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, - U.S. -, 85 Sup. Ct. 1246 (1965).
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whether the car should be declared a nuisance occurs only when the
vehicle owner is unwilling to enter into a consent decree or when the
prosecutor, convinced of the legality of the search against one who has
committed a serious violation or who has a bad record, knows he has a
very good case.
Although the above sanctions sometimes also are imposed upon those
searched or arrested by aggressive street patrols in high-crime areas, the
police view of what is achieved through the latter practice is somewhat
different. First, the activities of these patrols, though often illegal, are
considered an effective "show of force" that deters to some extent the
amount of street crime in the area. Also, the aggressive patrols sometimes
uncover evidence which aids in the investigation of other offenders-
persons who cannot raise the question of unlawful search because they
lack the standing to do so. 20° Stolen property is recovered, and, though
it is not contraband, it cannot be reclaimed by the person searched against
the claim of the rightful owner.20 - Thus, even though successful prosecu-
tion of the possessor may be impossible because of the nature of the search,
the police can clear another burglary or theft and can minimize the
actual harm done to the victim.
Removing dangerous weapons from circulation by the arrest-search
practices of the aggressive patrols is of considerable importance to the
police. Because guns and other weapons are not per se contraband,
20 2
the person searched might in many instances insist upon the return of
the weapon. Thus steps are frequently taken at one stage or another to
persuade the person involved not to press for its return. In some cases,
for example, the searching officer may indicate that he is being lenient
in merely seizing the weapon instead of having the person prosecuted for
carrying a concealed weapon.2 03 If the offender is actually brought to trial
200. The prevailing rule on standing is that in order to challenge a search and
seizure as unreasonable "one must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one
against whom the search was directed, as distinguished from, one who claims
prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search
or seizure directed at someone else." Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261
(1960). Compare the unique California position: "Since all of the reasons that
compelled us to adopt the exclusionary rule are applicable whenever evidence is
obtained in violation of constitutional guarantees, such evidence is inadmissible
whether or not it was obtained in violation of the particular defendant's constitu-
tional rights." People v. Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755, 759, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955).
201. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624 (1886).
202. Certain kinds of weapons, or weapons put to a particular use, are some-
times characterized as contraband. E.g., Gemert v. Pooler, 171 Wis. 271, 177 N.W.
1 (1920).
203. Sometimes the officer merely may seize the weapon and not make an
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for carrying a concealed weapon, but the search that uncovered the weapon
is declared to have been unreasonable, the judge may "suggest" to the
defendant that for his own good it would be best if the gun were not
returned to him.2 "
5. Toward Remedying the Situation
The arrest-for-purposes-other-than-conviction phenomenon is the prod-
uct of diverse, intermeshed causes. Moreover, it is a practice which tends to
be self-perpetuating; as this informal imposition of sanctions replaces
trial, conviction, and sentencing as a means of dealing with certain offenders,
to the knowledge of all participants in the criminal justice process, there
is less and less concern from all quarters about making the abandoned
formal processes workable. Under these circumstances, it is fair to say
that remedying the situation would not be an easy task.
It may be profitable to inquire whether the availability of the exclusionary
rule should not be broadened to prevent the government from further
profiting from the wrongdoings of the police. For example, the current
practice of making illegal searches because of an awareness that the fruits
thereof could be used in court against other persons'" raises a serious
arrest. For example, officers stopped a car because a tail light was burned out,
searched the driver, and found a knife in his pocket. They searched the entire
car but found nothing else of significance. One of the officers cautioned the driver
to have the light fixed and then walked back to the patrol car without returning
the knife. The suspect followed the officer back to the car and asked if he could
have his knife back, to which the officer responded: "Do you want to end up in
court?" The driver shrugged his shoulders, returned to his own car, and drove off.
204. For example, in one case a defendant was brought into court on a charge
of carrying a concealed weapon. Defendant's attorney made a motion to suppress,
after which the arresting officer explained that he made the arrest because he
thought the man matched a wanted notice for a robbery suspect. The officer made
no attempt to elaborate on this, and, in response to a question from the judge,
he said it was learned later that the defendant was not the wanted man and that
he had no record. The assistant prosecutor indicated he did not oppose suppression
of the gun, and the judge granted the motion. Then the judge asked the de-
fendant whether he desired to "stay out of trouble," to which the defendant re-
plied in the affirmative. The judge added, "Then you do not want the gun back,
do you?" Defendant and his counsel both quickly agreed.
205. Although the police undoubtedly are not totally aware of the significance
of the standing concept as it relates to how illegally obtained evidence might sub-
sequently be introduced in court, there is some appreciation of the possible use of
such evidence against others. For example, in Illinois the case of People v. Till-
man, 1 Ill.2d 525, 116 N.E.2d 344 (1954), 'has sometimes been called to the at-
tention of the police. There an informant of unknown reliability told officers that
a man of a certain description was selling narcotics and that he, along with a
heavy-set woman, could be found in a certain room in a certain hotel. They went
to the room and found such a woman standing in the hall outside the room and
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question concerning the prevailing doctrine on standing.20° Similarly, the
holding of some courts that the exclusionary rule has no application in a
forfeiture or similar proceeding because it is a civil action,20 7 when viewed
against the practice described earlier, also bears reexamination.2 0 8 It must
be admitted, however, that these doctrines on the limits of the exclusionary
rule are by no means the predominant causes of the described practices.209
How the pressures upon the police to exceed the limits of their authority
saw a man answering the description lying asleep in the room. The officers illegally
searched the woman and found narcotics on her person, and this evidence, to-
gether with the prior information was held to provide grounds for arrest and search
of the man.
206. See note 200 supra.
207. Courts taking this approach usually make two assumptions: (1) that
the exclusionary rule applies only in criminal cases; and (2) that a forfeiture
proceeding is not a criminal case. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan, 414 Pa. 540, 201 A.2d 427 (1964). Both assumptions are questionable. Part
of the considerable evidence that the Fourth Amendment has a much wider frame
of reference than mere criminal prosecutions is the fact that many of the searches
the colonists found so objectionable were made under forfeiture statutes. Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 376-77 (1959) (dissenting opinion). Moreover, forfeiture
actions begin to look much like criminal cases when one finds judges denying
forfeiture because of conviction or acquittal of the criminal charge on the theory
of double jeopardy, or denying forfeiture where it is discretionary because of a
view that the criminal sanction imposed was adequate. On the latter practice, see
Commonwealth v. One 1959 Chevrolet Impala Coupe, 201 Pa. Super. 145, 191 A.2d
717 (1963). As to the former: "The somewhat anomalous nature of forfeiture as,
in effect, punishment inflicted for a crime by means of a civil proceeding in rem
has given rise to most of the difficulties apparent in the cases determining whether
the results of a criminal prosecution for the offense in question should be regarded
as conclusive in the subsequent forfeiture proceeding. Under the traditional no-
tions as to double jeopardy, the state should be given only one shot at the of-
fender, and there seems to be little doubt that the man in the street would re-
gard the ordinary forfeiture proceeding, where property innocent in itself is taken
merely because it was allegedly used in carrying out a crime, as a second shot.
Such broad policy considerations would appear to justify the conclusion reached
in the case of Coffey v. United States (1886) 116 US 436 . . . that an acquittal
in the criminal prosecution bars the forfeiture as to the acquitted defendant. How-
ever, certain difficulties arise in the application of the rule. Neither the Coffey
Case nor subsequent cases applying its rule appear to have decided whether it is
founded upon broad res judicata principles or upon the rules as to double jeopardy
or autrefois acquit. The difference in the burden of 'proof imposed upon the gov-
ernment in the two proceedings, and at least technical differences in the parties
and issues, logically preclude an application of res judicata; and if double jeopardy
is relied upon, it is difficult to explain the numerous cases holding that a prior
conviction is no -bar to a subsequent forfeiture." Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1137, 1138-39
(1953).
208. Since the above was written the United States Supreme Court has re-
solved the question. In one 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, - U.S. -,
85 Sup. Ct. 1246 (1965), the Court held that the exclusionary rule is applicable to
forfeiture cases.
209. Many other purposes are served beyond admitting the evidence in for-
feiture proceedings or in criminal proceedings against others. Moreover, as noted
earlier, even where the exclusionary rule is thought applicable in forfeiture cases,
the consent decree device is still available.
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can be overcome is not readily apparent. Undoubtedly more could and
should be done by the organized bar to enhance public appreciation of
the importance of constitutional limitations on police authority, but this
is a long-range task. But, it has been said that
it is unsound to assume that police conduct is merely a necessary
effect of public attitudes, and that until the latter change, the
former will persist .... Indeed, the challenge to the conscientious
police official is precisely to use legal controls in such ways as to
alter unsound, undemocratic attitudes and misdirected emotions.2 10
It is unclear, however, whether this challenge can be met unless more
efforts are made to insulate the police from public pressures.
Police administrators generally have failed to subject the existing prac-
tices in their department to careful scrutiny and evaluation. "The average
police official traditionally concentrates on day-to-day requirements. He is
often so responsive to the needs of the day as to make time unavailable in
which to respond to the total law enforcement needs of the community
over a longer period of time."21- Thus, the arrest-for-purposes-other-than-
conviction practice continues as a presumably effective short-range solution,
without attention to the adverse impact the practice may have on attaining
other goals. For example, it would be relevant to ask whether deliberate
violation of existing rules on arrest and search in certain areas of enforce-
ment does not lead ultimately to greater across-the-board limitations upon
police authority.2 2
210. Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND L.J. 133, 161 (1953).
211. Goldstein, Research and Training Needs in Police Administration, Oct.
22, 1962 (paper prepared for Center for Programs in Government Administration,
University of Wisconsin).
212. Courts are undoubtedly influenced by their assumption as to how police
will react to legal requirements. If there is confidence that they will stay well
within defined limits, their powers may be stated broadly. "We like to grant large
powers so as to prevent any legal quibble about their extent, but we expect the
holders of them to act fairly and reasonably and well within them." DEvLIN, THE
CRIMINAL PROSECtrrION IN ENGLAND 16 (1958). On the other hand, if it is thought
that the police will regularly exceed the limits, the tendency is to impose severe
and perhaps unrealistic limitations. "Among the opponents of the amendment
[broadening the powers of the police in Japan] there seems to have been this.
feeling: Allow the police seven miles and they will go nine miles; therefore, if we
want to keep them at seven miles, better give them six miles." Abe, Police Deten-
tion and Arrest Privileges Under Foreign Law--Japan, 51 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S.
429, 423 (1960).
The search-incident-to-arrest-for-a-traffic-violation situation would appear to be
an excellent example. Some years ago I noted that few courts found reason to
question the validity of such searches. Note, 1959 Wis. L. REv. 347. This is no
longer true, and a number of appellate courts have condemned the practice. It is
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Of course, just as responsibility for the present situation does not lie
solely with the police, the police alone cannot remedy the situation. To
the extent that current practices are an accommodation resulting from
a basic difference between the police and the courts concerning the de-
sirability of enforcement against certain forms of professional gambling,
it is clear that means must be sought to overcome this internal conflict
in the criminal justice system. Some meaningful dialogue between the
police and the judiciary is desirable, to the end of eliminating insofar as
is possible the unhappy situation in which the police are responsible for
enforcement where conviction is largely unattainable or largely meaningless.
However, perhaps the greatest lesson to be learned from the practices
described herein is simply this: In the preoccupation with the exclusionary
rule sanction, the fact too often overlooked is that a negative sanction
can induce proper law enforcement behavior only if the police have available
proper and meaningful methods of carrying out the tasks that are expected
of them. This is in no sense depreciatory of the exclusionary rule itself,
for it "says nothing about the content of the law governing the police." 2' s
But the success of the exclusionary rule does depend in some measure
upon "the content of the law." It is unlikely, for example, that the present
mode of enforcement against the "wireroom" bookie will cease until some
lawful means of obtaining evidence against such an offender is clearly
identified.
[Part II of this article will appear in the Fall 1965 issue of the
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW]
my guess that this change in attitude is not attributable so much to a more
sophisticated analysis of the law of search and seizure than it is to a haunting
suspicion that the police were abusing the privilege. In this regard, it is interesting
to note that the cases in which the courts switched to the more restrictive view
often involved arrests for traffic violations not -by officers assigned to traffic en-
forcement, but instead by officers responsible for the vice crimes. E.g., Barnes v.
State, 25 Wis.2d 116, 130 N.W.2d 264 (1964); People v. Watkins, 19 Ill.2d 11, 166
N.E.2d 433 (1960).
213. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rile and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J.
CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 255 (1961).
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